

Will Publics Pay to Protect Rights?

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An Experimental Study of Mexico City Inhabitants' Willingness to Donate to Local Human Rights Organizations and of These Groups' Ability to Use This Data

A Report of the <u>Human Rights Organizations Project</u> at the University of Minnesota's Humphrey School of Public Affairs

Research Partners

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Key Takeaways

- Mexico City residents are more willing to donate money to local human rights organizations than human rights leaders believe.
- Trust in local rights groups is a crucial determinant of willingness to donate.
- Rights groups can boost donations by crafting appeals that emphasize their financial transparency and practical efficacy, and by focusing on the right type of person.
- The human rights "brand" enjoys a strong reputation among potential donors.
- Some human rights issues, such as women's rights and access to clean water, attract more donations than others, such as the rights of LGBT persons or forced disappearances.

Will Mexican citizens donate to their country's domestic human rights groups? The question is important; while rights groups are heavily dependent on foreign aid, NGO leaders say that they are keen to raise more money locally. Local resource mobilizations, they say, will bolster their financial sustainability, strengthen their public credibility, and improve their connections to local constituencies. Yet NGO leaders fear Mexicans won't donate, and are reluctant to invest scarce time, money, and effort in changing their minds.

To better explore the potential for human rights fundraising in Mexico, we conducted focus groups and a survey of 960 randomly selected adult residents of Mexico City. In spring and summer 2016 we asked about trust in local rights groups, attitudes towards human rights principles and policies, and existing philanthropic habits and preferences. We conducted also conducted two donation experiments, one of which involved real cash.

Our conclusions are cautiously optimistic: with the help of start-up investments from their overseas benefactors, we believe that Mexican rights groups can raise substantial sums from ordinary people. To do so, however, they will have to convince the public of their commitment to financial probity and transparency. Mexicans have long struggled with problems of official corruption and prefer to make their charitable donations directly to people in need, rather than through intermediaries. To win the trust and philanthropic contributions of ordinary Mexicans, local rights groups will have to convince them that their money will be used efficiently, honestly, and effectively.

This research was conducted by the University of Minnesota's Human Rights Organizations Project, in collaboration with two leading Mexican research institutions: the Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE) and FLACSO-Mexico. We are grateful for their expertise and collaboration. This research was made possible by financial support from the Open Society Foundations and the Harold E. Stassen Chair of International Affairs.

Chapter 1 Rising Interest in Local Funding for Domestic Rights Organizations

Shortly after taking office in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reinvigorated a law prohibiting civil society organizations from using foreign money for "activities detrimental to the national interest" and requiring locally operating NGOs to secure government permission when using overseas aid. Shortly thereafter, Modi's government placed the Ford Foundation and others on a list of banned foreign donors and prohibited some locally registered civic groups from accepting any overseas contributions.1 Activists say the Indian government is using the law to target political thorns in its side.²

India's crackdown on foreign funding to local NGOs is not unique. In fact, many autocracies, semi-autocracies, partial democracies, and even some full democracies are using similar laws to constrict civil society's ability to criticize their government.³ One important component of this "closing space" is an increasingly constrained regulatory environment for foreign aid to local civil society. One of the best-known cases is Russia, where Vladimir Putin removed NGOs' taxexempt status in 2008, levied harsh tributes on foreign aid to civil society, and obliged externally-supported groups to register as "foreign agents" in 2012.5 In Ethiopia, similarly, the government enacted a draconian foreign funding law in 2010, dramatically reducing the number of locally functioning NGOs, and all but decimating the local human rights sector.⁶ In 2016, the Israeli government passed a new law regulating those domestic NGOs that received aid from foreign governments, obliging them to identify themselves in ways that threaten their public legitimacy. From Africa to Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, civil

¹ Najar, Nida (2015). "Indian Authorities Put Restriction on Ford Foundation," New York Times, April 23, 2015 [Retrieved on January 12, 2017: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/indian-authorities-put-restrictionson-ford-foundation.html? r=0].

² Mohan, Rohini (2017), "Narendra Modi's Crackdown on Civil Society in India," New York Times, January 9, 2017 [Retrieved on January 12, 2017; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/opinion/narendra-modis-crackdown-on-civilsociety-in-india.html?smid=fb-share& r=0].

³ Carothers, Thomas and Saskia Brechenmacher (2014). Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Mendelson, Sarah. (2015). Why Governments Target Civil Society and What can be Done in Response: A New Agenda. Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

⁴ Christensen, Darin and Jeremy Weinstein. (2013). "Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs." Journal of Democracy, 24(2), pp. 77-91; Dupuy, Kendra, James Ron and Aseem Prakash. (2016). "Hands Off My Regime! Government Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organizations in Poor and Middle-Income Countries." World Development, 84, pp. 299–31.

⁵ Vernon, Rebecca (2009). "Closing the Door on Aid," *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law*, 11(4) [Retrieved on January 12, 2017: http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol11iss4/special 1.htm].

⁶ Dupuy, Kendra, James Ron, and Aseem Prakash (2015). "Who Survived? Ethiopia's Regulatory Crackdown on Foreign-Funded NGOs," Review of International Political Economy, 22(2), pp. 419-456.

⁷ Martin Levine (2016, July 13). "Life Becomes Harder for Some Israeli NGOs." Non-Profit Quarterly [Retrieved March 8, 2017 from https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/07/13/life-becomes-harder-israeli-ngos/]. For the (footnote continued)

society organizations are losing access to overseas aid, unraveling the global system of Westernsupported civic action established in the 1980s.8

Foreign aid may also dry up in countries such as Mexico, where the chances of official bans are low. International donors are fickle and prone to faddism, as this year's "hot" country or topic becomes next year's old hat. Economic crises in wealthy countries, moreover, may limit donations to developing countries, or sour donor-country citizens' willingness to support such aid. Local conditions also change. When Mexico joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, donors' attention began shifting to poorer countries.10 The availability of foreign aid to Mexican rights groups has increased of late, largely due to interest in the Ayotzinapa disappearances. 11 However, crisis-driven funding of this sort is, by definition, transitory; once international concern diminishes, so too will its funding.

Yet even when the overseas money keeps flowing, NGO reliance on external largesse can be pernicious. When social change organizations focus on outside sources, they leave local waters unfished, undermining efforts to develop deep roots among domestic constituents. They also risk the possibility that NGOs grow unaccountable to the very same people they seek to serve.¹² Foreign donors may have too much influence over local NGO agendas, and outsiders' priorities may not match those of local populations. 13 Furthermore, aid from outside the country can trigger intense competition among local groups, damaging civic solidarity. ¹⁴ Finally, dependence on overseas aid may play into the hands of political leaders who vilify local NGOs as foreign

dependence of Israeli rights groups on foreign aid, see Berkovitch, Nitza and Neve Gordon. (2008). "The Political Economy of Transnational Regimes: The Case of Human Rights. International Studies Quarterly, 52(4), 881-904.

⁸ For the emergence and growth of this system, see Reimann, Kim D. (2006). "A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs." *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(1), 45–68.

⁹ Swidler, Ann and Susan Cotts Watkins. (2009). "Teach a Man to Fish": The Sustainability Doctrine and Its Social Consequences. World Development, 37(7), 1182–1196.

¹⁰ Ron, James, Shannon Golden, Archana Pandya, Sarah Peek, Laura Sparling, and David Crow. 2014. The Human Rights Sector in Mexico: Evidence from the Public, Elites, and Activists. The Human Rights Organizations Project/ Americas and the World Project.

¹¹ According to almost 60% of Mexico City LHRO leaders, foreign funding has increased either "a little" (36%) or "a lot" (24%) in the last five years (N=34).

¹² Ron, James, Archana Pandya, and David Crow (2015). "Universal Values, Foreign Money. Funding Local Human Rights Organizations in the Global South," Review of International Political Economy, 23(1), 29-64. Jalali, Rita. (2013). "Financing Empowerment? How Foreign Aid to Southern NGOs and Social Movements Undermines Grass-Roots Mobilization," Sociology Compass, 7(1), pp. 55-73.

¹³ Edwards, Mark and David Hulme. (1996). "Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations." World Development, 24(6), 961–973.

¹⁴ Frey, Barbara (2015). "Uneven Ground: Asymmetries of Power in Human Rights Advocacy in Mexico." In Joel R. Pruce, ed. The Social Practice of Human Rights (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1–20; Stiles, Ken. (2002). International Support for NGOs in Bangladesh: Some Unintended Consequences. World Development, 30(5), 835-846.

agents. 15 Indeed, as discussed below, most Mexico City residents say that local rights groups should *not* rely on foreign funding.

Local NGOs in the global South, including local human rights organizations (LHROs), thus face an intractable dilemma. On the one hand, they rely heavily on foreign funding as a result of pathdependent processes initiated during the late 1980s and 1990s. 16 As a result, it is increasingly costly to seek domestic financing alternatives; developing the incentives and the capacity to raise local funds is financially, institutionally, and cognitively expensive. Yet at the same time, this dependence on foreign aid has harmful consequences and may diminish or disappear entirely.

International human rights donors and domestic rights organizations are acutely aware of these dangers, and both sides are keen to wean local rights groups of their foreign aid dependence. In the global rights sector, the Open Society Foundation, Ford Foundation, the International Human Rights Funders Group, and many others are increasingly interested in devising new, sustainable, and locally-oriented "business models" for local rights organizations. 17

Today, however, rights groups in Mexico City devote little effort to raising local funds. As Figure 1.0 shows below, only 29% of the 34 Mexico City human rights leaders we interviewed in 2016 reported that their group had ever attempted to solicit funding from private individuals in Mexico, and only 15% reported any success in that regard. Almost 66% of these NGO leaders said they had never tried to host a fundraising event with ordinary Mexican citizens, and 97% said their groups had no mechanism for enrolling ordinary citizens as member-supporters. Instead, Mexico City NGO leaders told us their organizations depend overwhelmingly on funding from foreign sources.

¹⁵ Darin and Weinstein, 2013. This kind of de-legitimization occurs in some, but not all, cases, according to Ron, James and David Crow. (2015). "Who Trusts Local Human Rights Organizations? Evidence from Three World Regions." Human Rights Quarterly, 37(2015), 188–239.


¹⁶ We describe this process in Ron, et al, 2015.

¹⁷ See, for example, the debate among funders, practitioners and scholars on the openGlobalRights website, "New Business Models for Human Rights: Innovative Structures and Strategies." [Retrieved on March 10, 2017: https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/new-business-models-for-human-rights]

Figure 1.0
Funding for Mexico City's local human rights organizations (LHROs) is overwhelmingly foreign-based

Q (to LHRO leaders): What type of organizations, foundation, or institutions have you solicited/received funding from in the past fiscal year? (Select all that apply)

Observations (N) for each category (received, solicited) is 34.



Percentage of respondents

When asked to what extent they agreed that foreign aid is necessary to (1) the Mexican human rights sector and (2) their organization, 100% of rights NGO leaders either "agreed" or "strongly agreed" with both statements, with a clear majority choosing the latter (see Figure 1.1). Not only is foreign funding necessary, it is also the least difficult money to get. As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, 59% of rights NGO leaders told us that foreign money was either "easy" (50%), or "very easy" (9%) to attract. In stark contrast, most NGO leaders reported that it was either "difficult" (27%) or even "very difficult" (42%) to raise money from Mexican individuals.

Figure 1.1 Most leaders of Mexico City rights NGOs think foreign funding is vital for their survival.

Q (to LHRO leaders): To what extent do you agree, or disagree, with the following statements about foreign funding? (N=34)





Figure 1.2

Most leaders of Mexico City rights NGOs say it is easier to raise money from foreign organizations than from ordinary Mexicans

Q (to LHRO leaders): How difficult, or easy, is it for organizations such as yours to attract funding from




Yet. Figure as shows, 68% of Mexico's rights NGO leaders told us they were "quite a bit" or "very much" (56%)worried about maintaining their organizations' funding over the next three years.

Regardless of how easy or hard it will be to raise local funds, the overwhelming majority

Figure 1.3
Most leaders of Mexico City rights NGOs are worried about maintaining their funding in the medium term.

Q (to LHRO leaders): How worried are you about maintaining a steady flow of resources for your organization over the next 3 years?

(N=34)



of rights NGO leaders believe that resource mobilization within Mexico itself is vital to their organizations' sustainability (Figure 1.4). Local funding from Mexican citizens, NGO leaders say, will strengthen their organization's finances, increase the population's sense of local ownership, and enhance NGOs' public legitimacy, (Figure 1.5), while also strengthening the city's non-governmental rights sector overall (Figure 1.6).

Figure 1.4 Most leaders of Mexico City rights NGOs believe local funding could help their organizations.

Q (to LHRO leaders): On a scale of 1 to 7, how much do you believe that higher levels of funding from Mexican resources could help the sustainability of your organization?





Figure 1.5 Most leaders of Mexico City rights NGOs say local funding would have positive impacts.

Q (to LHRO leaders): In your opinion, in what way is local funding important to improving the human rights sector in Mexico City? (Select all that apply.)



Local funding from individual citizencontributors might also give Mexico City rights groups more discretionary funding to allocate as they see fit. On average, 76% of funding for Mexico City LHROs is allocated to specific projects, and only 16% is used for indirect costs. Thus, Mexico City's rights groups are tightly restricted in how they can spend their money.

Most of the city's LHRO leaders told us they were deeply pessimistic about their ability to raise local funds, fearing that ordinary Mexico City residents are either "very" (32%) or "somewhat" (29%) unwilling to donate (Figure 1.7).

Figure 1.6
Most leaders of Mexico City rights NGOs believe local funding would strengthen the non-governmental rights sector overall.

Q (to LHRO leaders): To what extent do you feel local funding is important for improving the human rights sector in Mexico City?

(N=34)





Figure 1.7
Most leaders of Mexico City's rights NGOs fear the general public won't donate.

Q (to LHRO leaders): In your opinion, how willing, or unwilling, are residents of Mexico City to donate to organizations such as yours?

(N=34)



Yet our data suggest greater room for optimism. Aided by evidence-based strategies and carefully crafted appeals, local human rights organizations can raise more money from individual Mexico City residents.

Methodology

The bulk of this report is based on a statistically representative poll of Mexico City's adult residents that we commissioned in summer 2016. In June 2016, we piloted a preliminary version of the survey with 100 individuals in Mexico City and revised the questionnaire based on those responses. From July 11 to 22, 2016, we administered

the revised survey to 960 randomly selected individuals through face-to-face interviews conducted in the doorways of their residences. For a summary of our sampling methods, please see Chapter 7 below.

The questionnaire we used for this study draws on earlier versions of our *Human Rights Perception Poll*, a survey instrument that our partners and we have administered since 2012 in Mexico and Colombia (nationally), Morocco (in Casablanca, Rabat, and rural surroundings), Nigeria (in Lagos and its rural surroundings), and India (in Mumbai and the rural areas of Maharashtra state). In all these surveys, our goal has been to learn about the public's attitudes towards human rights principles, policies, and organizations, as well as their experiences and familiarity with the domestic rights sector. For this 2016 Mexico City survey, we added a new series of questions and field experiments to explore the public's donation habits and preferences. We will replicate this study in Bogota, Colombia, in summer 2017.

groups.

19 James Ron, Shannon Golden, David Crow and Archana Pandya. 2017. *Taking Root: Public Opinion and Human Rights in the Global South*. New York: Oxford University Press.

¹⁸ Working in consultation with one another, the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE, www.cide.edu) designed, implemented, and analyzed the general public survey, and the Facultad Latinomaericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-México; www.flacso.edu.mx) designed and carried out the LRHO leader interviews. The CIDE and FLACSO teams collaborated on the focus group discussion guide. The CIDE-FLACSO team worked with local partner Data OPM (www.dataopm.net) to field the general public survey and recruit/moderate the focus groups.

Prior to launching this Mexico City survey, we conducted four focus groups in April 2016 with 48 city residents, exploring their understanding of philanthropy, social change, and human rights. We also interviewed 34 leaders of Mexico City's non-government human rights organizations from April to July 2016, asking about their funding strategies, challenges, and perceptions of the general public's views.²⁰ For more details on how we selected these groups for interview, see Chapter 7 below.

In the general public survey, we conducted two survey experiments aimed at exploring respondents' willingness to donate. In the first, we gave each respondent \$50 pesos, in 5-peso coins, and explained that the money was theirs to keep. For the donation petition respondents heard, we varied the way in which we described a hypothetical Mexican human rights group, emphasizing alternative organizational qualities—each respondent only heard one organization description.²¹ We then offered respondents the option of donating some, all, or none of the 50 pesos to the organization in question.²² In the second experiment, we presented respondents with different combinations of hypothetical organizations, varying their attributes by organizational "brand," issue, and activity. We then asked respondents to divvy up \$100 hypothetical pesos between each.²³

Once we analyzed the data, we invited all 34 rights NGOs to a February 2017 conference held on the FLACSO campus in Mexico City, and 19 attended. We presented our survey results, and then conducted small-group workshops on data use. After the conference, we sent out a feedback survey to attendees, and received positive responses (see Chapter 8 below). In summer 2017, we two members of our team – Mexican graduate students studying at the University of Minnesota – spend three months with rights NGOs in Mexico City, helping them to use our data to build new campaigns and funding proposals.

²⁰ We identified 40 locally based HROs in Mexico City and interviewed 34 of their leaders.

²¹ We randomly allocated each of the 960 public survey respondents into one of four different groups.

This experiment draws on the tradition of "narrative framing" experiments used in other studies of philanthropic giving, such Merchant, A., Ford, J. B., & Sargeant, A. (2010). Charitable organizations' storytelling influence on donors' emotions and intentions. *Journal of Business Research*, 63(7), 754–762.; Merchant, A., Ford, J. B., & Rose, G. (2011). How personal nostalgia influences giving to charity. Journal of Business Research, 64(6), 610–616. 23 This experiment draws on the "discrete choice experiment" used in economic and market studies, such as Carroll, J. D., & Green, P. E. (1997). Psychometric methods in marketing research: Part II, multidimensional scaling. Journal of Marketing Research, 34(2), 193–204; Kuhfield, W.F., Tobias, R.D., & Garratt, M. (1994). Efficient Experimental Design with Marketing Research Applications. *Journal of Market Research*, 31(4), 545-557.

Why Mexico City?

Mexico City is an appropriate venue for this study. Although most residents do not *currently* donate to local rights NGOs, they *could* donate, in theory, because they profess pro-human rights sentiments, have comparatively high trust in human rights organizations, are exposed to a gamut of human rights challenges, and live in Latin America's fifth wealthiest country.²⁴ Moreover, charitable giving is not foreign to Mexico City residents; as we show below, many already donate to civic groups such as parent-teacher associations and religious institutions. More generally. Mexico is home to over 27,000 registered NGOs, and the government offers a reasonably enabling environment for citizen action.²⁵ The capital alone boasts dozens of locally headquartered, legally registered groups dedicated to promoting rights. Newspapers, radio stations, and TV networks also concentrate here, giving Mexico City residents access to substantial information on rights issues and defenders.

In short, if there is *anywhere* in the global South where people might be persuaded to donate to local human rights organizations, Mexico City is a most likely venue for success.

²⁴ In 2016, the top five countries by per capita GDP (PPP) were Chile, at \$23,336; Panama, at \$22,800; Uruguay, at \$21,600; Argentina, at \$20,200; and Mexico, at \$18,900. See CIA World Factbook, accessed at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html, on 27 April 2017/

²⁵ Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (Sedesol) (2014). "CEPAL e Indesol discuten macroeconomía y derechos humanos," Conecta Indesol, 2(18) [Retrieved January 13, 2017: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/ file/116272/Conecta Indesol Mural No. 18.pdf].

Chapter 2 Focus Group Results: Conceptualizing Charitable Donations, Social Issues, and Human Rights

Our survey contractor organized and facilitated four focus groups in Mexico City on April 19th and 20th, 2016, while members of our team watched from the side. Each focus group had 12 participants, and each conversation lasted approximately 90 minutes. We incentivized participation with modest financial compensation, food and beverages. We selected participants who both had, and had not, made a charitable donation in the last 12 month.

The purpose of our focus groups was to 1) balance our quantitative survey data with qualitative insights, and 2) deepen our understanding of charitable giving and giving behavior in Mexico City. The focus group results, in turn, shaped our public survey questionnaire. Ultimately, the insights we gleaned from the focus groups were confirmed by statistical analysis of the survey data.

During the focus groups, we asked a variety of questions (see Appendix A) about the participants' attitudes towards and experiences with charitable giving. Three major themes resurfaced throughout these conversations: lack of public trust in institution, concern with organizational transparency, and a disconnect between Mexican rights groups and their constituents. These concepts are linked—if someone does not trust an organization, they likely crave more transparency. And if someone has been connected to an organization, they desire more information on what the organization is and does before trusting the group with their money.

When we asked participants what might entice them to donate to a human rights organization, we repeatedly heard that they want to know where the money is going and how it is being used. They want "evidence for what it [the donation] is for....to have contact with the person who will benefit... [and] to know what it is being used for."²⁶ If an organization wants to raise money, it needs to give "good information to convince us that what we donate is going to go where it is supposed to go."27

Which human rights issues matter most? When we asked focus group participants what issues come to mind when they hear the words "human rights," they mentioned broad topics such as the right to live, the right to equality, the right to breathe, and constitutional rights. However, when

²⁶Original Spanish: "...evidencia para que vaya ser... tener contacto con la persona que será beneficiada, que está haciendo con ello... para que lo esté usando... "

²⁷ Original Spanish: "Buena información para convencernos de que lo que donamos va llegar a dónde va a llegar... vídeos..."

we asked what would make them want to donate to human rights organizations, participants clearly preferred organizations that "directly help people" ("[a]yuda directa a las personas"). We heard various times some version of the phrase, "ayuda directa," direct assistance, in conjunction with words such as "community" and "the people." Direct assistance was attractive to the focus group participants because it reduces their concern about the inappropriate use of their donated money; direct assistance, in other words, boosts trust. As one participants summed up, "Trust [is needed for me donate], but reality contrasts with what they [human rights organizations] promote in the media ... and on many occasions this does not resemble real-life problems; they may argue that they are working for human rights, but the reality is something else."²⁸

In essence, participants told us that they felt that Mexican rights organizations were not explaining how they used the money they were being given and were not credibly demonstrating that their work was leading to meaningful change. How, then, could ordinary citizens know their money was actually being used to help others and not being pocketed by NGO staff or wasted on inappropriate expenses?

Although focus group participants lived in Mexico City, the country's human rights organizational hub, none could name a specific non-governmental rights organization based in Mexico City. Some were able to name the official government rights organization, the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH), as well as international groups such as Greenpeace, UNICEF, and the United Nations. This dearth of name recognition reinforces our sense that the general population is disconnected from, and knows very little about, the city's human rights sector.

Participants were unimpressed by organizations that are "patrocinadas," or sponsored—especially those tied to political parties or religious institutions. We probed specifically about those two institutions and found the Church has a better image than political parties: "If sponsored by a church, yes, [I would support it], but above all, the priests are to be trusted," one respondent replied, and another said, "The Catholic image—religion is more moving than political matters…" Yet the Church also had many critics, and the lack of institutional trust came through strongly in the focus groups. As one participant observed, "whether it's a political

²⁸Original Spanish: "Confiar, pero la realidad la contrastas con lo que promueven en los medios... y en muchas ocasiones esta no se asemeja con las problemáticas de la vida real, ellos te pueden plantear que están trabajando por los derechos humanos, pero la realidad es otra..."

²⁹ Original Spanish: "Que la patrocinara una iglesia sí, pero sobre todo que sean curas que se confiara..."

³⁰ Original Spanish: "La imagen católica, una religión lo movería más que en cuestión de un movimiento político"

party or church, it's all the same. At the end of the day, they keep everything for themselves."31 As another said, "...political parties, religious matters... I don't trust them." 32

Taken together, the focus groups suggest that many residents of Mexico City do not donate to human rights groups because they know little (or nothing) about them; mistrust organizations and institutions in general; have a strong demand for greater organizational transparency on the part of charitable recipients; and prefer to give money directly to those in need, rather than to intermediaries, such as human rights organizations. In addition, they either have never been asked to donate or do not understand how to donate. All of this points to a substantial disconnect between Mexico City rights groups and the city's population.

The people who do donate charitably tend to do so via the Church (goods, time and money); by rounding up the bill at stores through store-organized programs; by donating at an ATM; or by giving directly to the *Teletón*, a Mexican foundation with 24-hour radio and TV broadcast that raises money for children with disabilities, the Red Cross (typically during natural disasters), and other concrete causes.

The focus groups suggest that rights organizations must pay greater attention to their own credibility and transparency; should emphasize the concrete effects of their work; and should be far more involved in city and community life so as to generate more name recognition, social ties, and trust. Armed with this information, we were able to create a stronger, more accurate general survey of the Mexico City population.

³¹ Original Spanish: "No, es lo mismo, ya sea partido político, iglesia, es lo mismo, al final de cuentas se quedan con

³² Original Spanish: "...partidos políticoos, cuestiones religiosas no confió..."

Chapter 3: Polling Results - Public Attitudes towards Human Rights in Mexico City


We decided to begin our inquiry by assessing the Mexico City public's interest in human rights "remedies" of any kind. Does the public think the country has human rights problems that need to be fixed? If not, it will be particularly hard for local rights groups to raise money from ordinary people.

Happily for Mexico City's rights groups, the polling data clearly suggest strong demand for their work. As Figure 3.0 shows, 63% of our 960-strong sample of Mexico City residents said the country was plagued by human rights problems; 46% said there was "not much" respect, while 17%

Figure 3.0
Most Mexico City residents say human rights in their country are not respected

Question (to general public): In your opinion, to what extent are human rights respected in Mexico? (N=952)

Question (to LHRO leaders): In your opinion, to what extent does the public think human rights are respected in Mexico? (N=34)



said there was "no respect" at all. The data also shows that leaders of the city's locally organized rights organizations have a reasonably accurate perception of these sentiments. When asked for *their* estimate of the public's assessment, the 34 LHRO leaders we interviewed only slightly overestimated the depth of public concern.

How do Mexico City Inhabitants Conceptualize "Human Rights"?


Leaders of Mexico City's rights-based NGOs are more pessimistic than warranted about public sentiments towards their "brand," human rights. Despite their fears, the general Mexico City public is strongly supportive of the term. This strong "brand approval," in turn, bodes well for NGO fundraising.


To assess popular attitudes towards the human rights brand, we read a series of phrases to the 960 public survey respondents, asking to what extent they associated a specific phrase with the

words, "human rights." We asked respondents to rate their perceptions a scale of 1 ("I do not associate at all") to 7 ("I associate very strongly").

As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, Mexico City residents tend to associate the words, "human rights," with positive-sounding phrases, such as protecting women's rights, protecting people from torture and murder, protecting myself and my family, and promoting socioeconomic justice. Most members of the public, moreover, reject the association of human rights with negative sounding phrases, such as promoting foreign values and ideas, promoting U.S. interests, protecting criminals, protecting political malcontents, or not protecting and promoting anyone's interests. The leaders of Mexico City's non-governmental rights organizations, however, do not fully appreciate the extent to which ordinary people trust their brand. On this count, at least, the NGO leaders are unduly pessimistic, and may therefore be underestimating the opportunities for local fundraising.

Figure 3.1
The Mexico City public has positive associations with "brand human rights"







Feelings of "Solidarity"

Potential donations to Mexican rights groups will not be shaped only by assessments of the country's human rights problems or attitudes towards the human rights brand; they will also be shaped by the public's attachment to, or empathy with, specific groups. To assess, we asked respondents how much "solidarity" they felt towards specific subgroups, once again using a 1-7 scale. Here, a score of 1 signifies, "I feel no solidarity at all," while a score of 7 signifies, "I feel total solidarity." As Figure 3.2 demonstrates, Mexico City residents feel the most solidarity with women (with an average score of 6.3) and people living in poverty, (6.3); they feel the least solidarity with people accused of committing crimes, (4.2) the LGBT community (5), and Central American migrants (5.3). Note, however, that residents felt warmly towards all groups mentioned, as all the average solidarity scores exceeded the midpoint of 4.

These findings suggest that all other things being equal, it will be easier to raise money for women's and basic socio-economic rights. Raising money to protect the rights of people targeted by the government's crackdown on crime, by contrast, may be more difficult, as will fundraising for the rights of LGBT persons and Central American migrants.

Figure 3.2 Mexico City residents feel the most solidarity with women and the poor.







Ranking Human Rights Issues

People often have an implicit rank ordering of the issues they care most about, and this too should shape potential donations. To assess the Mexico City public's priorities, we presented respondents with a list of common human rights issues and asked them to rate their importance on a 1-7 scale. For this question, a score of 1 meant, "This issue is not important at all to me," while 7 meant, "this is issue is very important to me".

Although the public ranked all issues above the midpoint, they prioritized basic education for all and healthcare for all, and afforded the least importance to abuses committed by the army and the police (Figure 3.3). These findings dovetail with those from the previous section, which showed that the public has more solidarity with the poor, and less with people accused of committing crimes. Once again, the polling evidence suggests Mexican rights groups will have more success in raising funds for social and economic rights, and less in raising money to combat abuses linked to the government's war on organized crime.

Figure 3.3 Mexico City residents say education and healthcare are their top human rights priorities.





To summarize, Mexico City residents articulate a clear demand for improved human rights conditions and hold positive attitudes towards "brand human rights." Their strongest sense of emotional attachment is with women and the poor, and their weakest is with persons accused of

committing crimes, Central American migrants, and the LGBT community. Capital city residents care most about protecting basic socioeconomic rights and comparatively less about protecting victims in the official war on crime. Although leaders of Mexico City's rights organizations are generally accurate in their assessments of the public's sentiments, their fears about the population's regard for "brand human rights" are exaggerated. And while many Mexican rights organizations focus on abuses by the criminal justice system and government security forces, neither are the public's top human rights priority, suggesting that NGO fundraising for the protection of basic socioeconomic rights will meet with the most enthusiasm.

Chapter 4: **Polling Results - Public Attitudes towards Human Rights Organizations**

Here, we consider how the Mexico City public views the city's human rights organizations themselves. Above, we examined how the public assesses human rights conditions, the human rights "brand," specific groups of vulnerable people, and how it ranks human rights priorities. In this section, we examine the reputation of rights organizations, as this too is likely to be a powerful driver of the public's willingness to donate. Groups that are better known, better liked, and better trusted will likely be more successful in efforts to raise funds.

In this case, our survey results offer both encouraging and less encouraging. On the positive side, the data show that the public views human rights organizations in general with favor; trust in the non-governmental rights sector as a whole resembles trust in the Mexican army and church, the country's most publicly esteemed institutions. Trust in NGOs working on women's rights is also high, as is trust in groups working on the right to clean water. Importantly, respondents reject claims that Mexican rights groups are somehow advancing the interests of the US government, a concern voiced elsewhere by activists, academics and political leaders.³³ On the less encouraging side, we found that the public's trust in groups working on LGBT rights is comparatively low, as is their trust in groups focusing on abuses by the government and military. These findings correlate with those detailed above about the public's preference for social and economic rights. We also found that the public is more likely to view Mexican rights groups as "corrupt" and "elitist" than as "brave" and "effective," and that most believe that LHROs should not receive foreign funding.

To assess general attitudes towards different types of actors, we asked respondents to what extent they trusted 13 different types of Mexican and foreign actors, using a 1-4 scale in which higher numbers denoted greater trust (4 = "A lot of trust"; 3= "Some trust"; 2 = "A little trust"; 1 = "No trust at all"). Thus, averages above the midpoint of 2.5 indicate that more people trusted the actor than not, while averages below the midpoint suggest the opposite.


As Figure 4.0 indicates, the public awarded Mexican human rights organizations ("Local HROs") in general an average score of 2.6, just above the trust scale's midpoint. Comparatives matter more than absolute trust scores, however, as Mexico is a generally low-trust environment,

³³ See David Crow and James Ron. (2017). "Public Attitudes towards Human Rights Organizations and U.S. Power." Manuscript under review. See also David Crow and James Ron. (2016, November 29). "Human Rights Groups are Secretly U.S. Agents. True or False?" Washington Post. Retrieved January 14, 2017: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/29/human-rights-groups-are-secretly-u-s-agentstrue-or-false/].

driving *all* rankings down. Here, the results are particularly encouraging, as average trust in local rights groups (2.6) topped average trust in the army (2.3) and religious institutions (2.2), the country's most revered institutions, and far outstripped trust in "Mexican politicians" (1.3).

To see whether Mexico City's rights leaders accurately gauged public sentiment on this count, we asked the 34 rights leaders how *they* thought the public would respond, and learned that they overestimated public trust in religious institutions and underestimated trust in the army. They had relatively accurate estimates of the public's trust in their own sector and in Mexico's politicians. Interestingly, most LHRO leaders believed the public would trust their *own* organization more than the sector overall.

Figure 4.0 Mexico City residents have comparatively high trust in local rights organizations.



Concerned that respondents might have inflated their trust so as to appear more appropriate in the eyes of our interviewers, we asked them to also estimate how much *other* people trusted local rights groups. Some respondents, we hoped, would be more willing to reveal their *own* trust by framing that opinion as *someone else's*. There was a difference in responses, but it was not huge;

respondents' own reported trust in LHROs averaged 2.6, while their assessment of *other people's* trust averaged 2.4. Our estimate of the public's trust in LHROs, in other words, is only marginally inflated by "social desirability bias."³⁴


We also asked respondents how much they trusted rights groups working on specific issues, including 1) women's rights; 2) abuses by the military or police; 3) gay and lesbian rights; and 4) the right to clean water. As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, the public trusts groups working on women's rights the most (2.9), followed by NGOs promoting the right to potable water (2.6), LGBT rights (2.5) and advocating for victims of government abuse (2.4). The difference between the most and least trusted LHROs was roughly 0.5 on the 1-4 scale, a modestly significant gap of 16.6%. Although rights NGO leaders overestimated public trust in their sector as a whole, they correctly guessed that the public would trust women's rights groups the most.

Figure 4.1 Mexico City residents have more trust in NGOs working on women's rights and clean water.

Q (to general public): Please tell me how much you trust human rights organizations working on _____.

Q (to LHRO leaders): How much trust do you think the public places in organizations working on _____.

All observations (N) at least 29 (LHRO leaders) and 940 (general public)



^{*}Not asked in LHRO survey

³⁴ Social desirability bias is the natural psychology tendency of respondents to present themselves in the best light as good citizens and people and say what they think the interviewers want to hear. See, Belli, R. F., Traugott, M. W., Young, M., & Mcgonagle, K. A. (2010). Reducing Vote Overreporting in Surveys: Social Desirability, Memory Failure, and Source Monitoring. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 63(1), 90–108; Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24(4), 349–354.

Next, we asked respondents to what extent they associated specific adjectives with local rights groups, using the 1-7 ascending scale of association. We asked about three positive-sounding adjectives – "brave", "effective," and "connected to the needs of ordinary people" – and three negative-sounding adjectives – "corrupt," "elitist," and "serving the interests of the U.S. government." The results are less than flattering. As Figure 4.2 shows, Mexico City residents are

more likely associate local rights groups with the word corrupt (with an average association score of 5.1) and *elitist* (4.7) than with effective (4.4) or brave (4.2), although the latter two were still above the midpoint of 4. Respondents reject the notion that local rights NGOs connected to needs of ordinary people (3.8), but also tend to dismiss claims that Mexican rights groups are serving the interests the US of government (3.8).


Unfortunately, the leaders of Mexico City rights groups

Figure 4.2
Mexico City residents more likely to view LHROs as "elitist" and "corrupt" than as "effective" and "brave."

Q (to general public): Please tell me how much you associate non-governmental human rights organizations in Mexico City with -

Q (to LHRO leaders): Please tell me how much you think the Mexico City public associates non-governmental human rights organizations in Mexico City with _____

All observations (N) at least 33 and 925 (general public)



underestimate the strength of the public's negative sentiments towards rights NGOs. Thus, the rights leaders thought the public would be less likely to associate *corrupt* (anticipating an average score of 2.8) and *elitist* (3.1) with human rights organizations, and more likely to associate *brave* (5.2). Here, the rights leaders were off by at least 1 point in each category, with the *corrupt* association having the biggest difference (2.3 points). These are substantial gaps in the leaders' and public's views.


Why would Mexico City residents have comparatively high trust in the local rights sector as a whole while also associating these groups with negative terms? How can Mexico City citizens trust the very same organizations that they view as "corrupt" and "elitist?" In part, it is because the people who feel one way are not the others; that is, those who trust LHROs are partly different from those who view them negatively. Still, the two groups of respondents are sufficiently large that there is some overlap, driven perhaps by the fact that publics have little knowledge of, and contact with, individual rights groups (see below). As a result, the public's opinions may not be fully formed and coherent, providing rights groups with an opportunity to define themselves in the popular mind.

Contact with LHROs

The biggest problem we identified for rights groups as potential public fundraisers was that very few people could name a specific rights organization, had met someone working for one such group, or had ever been directly contacted by one. As seen in Figure 4.3, only 17% told us they had "heard about an organization or association working in the field of human rights in Mexico," but only 7% could actually specify an actual name. Of these. most mentioned Mexico's official **National** Human Rights Commission rather than an NGO. Specific nongovernmental rights

Figure 4.3
Mexico City rights NGOs have limited contact with the general public.

- Q (to general public): 1) Have you ever heard of organizations or associations working in the field of human rights in Mexico?
 - 2) Have you ever met someone that works in a human rights organization?
- 3) Has a human rights organization directly contact you in person, by phone, or by mail?



Contact type

groups; in other words, enjoy very little public name recognition. Only 18%, similarly, said they had ever "met someone who works at a human rights organization," while only 6% said they had ever been "contacted directly in person, by phone, or by mail" by such a group. LHRO outreach in Mexico City, it seems, is quite limited.

Direct contact is important for all manner of reasons. Our previous research, for example, shows that greater contact with rights groups is associated with greater trust, 35 while additional data analyses (not shown here) shows that "knowing someone who worked in a human rights organization" is correlated with greater trust in rights NGOs in general *and* with greater trust in groups working on women's rights, LGBT individuals, persons subjected to forced disappearance, and the right to potable water. Clearly, Mexico City rights groups should supplement their public education and communication strategies with much greater efforts to reach out, meet, and form meaningful connections with ordinary people.

From Where Should LHROs Receive Money?


Although Mexico City respondents do not know that most local rights groups rely on foreign aid, most would disapprove if they did. We asked residents "how appropriate is it for Mexican human rights organizations to receive funding" from eight possible sources: 1) governments of other countries, 2) citizens of other countries, 3) international organizations, 4) Mexican businesses, 5) Mexican citizens, 6) the Mexican government, 7) Mexican political parties, and 8) the Church. We used a 1-7 scale, in which 1 meant respondents felt the funding source was "not at all appropriate," while 7 meant the source was "very appropriate." As Figure 4.4 demonstrates, Mexico City residents clearly prefer domestic over foreign money. Respondents awarded an average "appropriateness" score of 6 to the Mexican government, 5.5 to businesses, and 5.3 to political parties, and 5.2 to individual citizens. They *reject* the appropriateness of funding by foreign governments (3.9) and foreign citizens (3.7), but are more comfortable with funding from international organizations (4.7), such as the U.N. Unfortunately, as Figure 4.5 shows, rights NGO leaders substantially underestimate the extent to which the public disapproves of their foreign-supported funding model.

³⁵ See Ron, James, and David Crow (2015). "Who Trusts Local Human Rights Organizations? Evidence from Three World Regions," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 37(1): 188-239.

Figure 4.4 Mexico City residents favor domestic funding for local rights NGOs.

Q (to general public): Mexican organizations working to protect human rights often receive money from Mexican and foreign sources. On a scale of 1 to 7...how appropriate is it, in your opinion, for Mexican rights groups to receive money from


All observations (N) at least 943



Funding source

Figure 4.5
Leaders of Mexico City rights NGOs don't appreciate the extent to which citizens disapprove of foreign funding.

Q (to LHRO leaders): To what extent do you agree, or disagree, with the following statement "The public perceives foreign funding for Mexican NGOs or non-profits positively."



^{*&}quot;Don't know" excluded, thus percentages not equal to 100%


Chapter 5: Polling Results - Civic Participation and Philanthropy in Mexico City

To learn what Mexico City residents are currently doing with respect to civic participation and charitable donations, we asked, *Have you ever participated in the activities of the following organizations?*, followed by a list of nine alternatives. Remarkably, 54% said they had participated in at least one such organization, typically in parent-teacher (22%) and neighborhood associations (18%); environmental organizations, political parties, religious organizations (15-16%); social movements (11%); unions (8%); and human rights organizations (6%). Note that we did not define these organizations ourselves, leaving respondents to interpret terms such as "social movements" or "human rights organizations" as they saw fit.

Figure 5.0 In Mexico City, citizen participation in the activities of rights NGOs is comparatively modest

Q (to general public): Could you tell me if you have ever participated in/donated to the following organizations?

*All observations (N) at least 956 (participated) and 951 (donated)




We also asked about financial donations to these different types of organization, and learned that 46% had donated to at least one, once in their lives. The only two Mexico City civic groups receiving donations from more than 10% of the total sample were parent-teacher associations (15%) and religious organizations (14%). Roughly 8% reported they had donated to neighborhood associations and environmental organizations, followed by 6% to "human rights organizations" (as per the respondents' own definition), social movements (5%) and unions (4%). Political parties fared the worst, receiving donations from less than 2% of the sample (they are rounded up in Figure 5.1).

5.1 **Figure** shows that participation is more common than donation for all organization types. Human rights groups, however, have participation-donation smallest gap; the percentage who report participating in local rights groups is only 0.6 points higher than the percentage of those reporting to have donated. This gap is slightly higher for religious organizations (1.2 points) and unions (3.7), and is highest for political parties (14.3 points). The participation/donation gap for neighborhood associations (9.5),environmental organizations (7.7), and parentteacher associations (7.3 points) are in the spectrum's middle.

Another way of examining the participation/donation gap is to measure the overlap between

Figure 5.1 In Mexico City, human rights organizations have the lowest participation-donation gap.



participants and donors. Using this measure, religious organizations and parent-teacher associations are best off, as 69% and 61% of their participants, respectively, have also donated to that same type of organization. Human rights groups lag slightly with an overlap of 57%, followed by neighborhood associations and social movements (37%). The lowest overlap rate of (10%) was reported for political parties.


How Recently—and Voluntarily—Do People Donate?

Since *voluntary* donations are stronger indicators of commitment than obligatory payments, we asked those respondents who told us they had donated to a civic organization whether the payment was voluntary or compulsory. Averaging from the data presented in Figure 5.2, we learned that almost 82% of donations were voluntary. For unions, parent-teacher associations, and political parties, compulsory donating was higher than the norm. And since *recent* donations are also a stronger sign of commitment than those in the distant past, we asked whether respondents' donations had occurred in past 12 months. As Figure 5.2 shows, human rights groups, social movements, and parent-teacher associations were the strongest performers on this count.

Figure 5.2 In Mexico City, most donations to civic groups are voluntary.

Q (to general public): Was the donation compulsory or voluntary? / Did you donate to this organization in the past 12 months?

Observations (N) range from 10-169 (voluntary + compulsory) and are at least 956 (participation)




Taken together, Figures 5.0, 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate that in Mexico City, the civic organizations with the highest combined rates of participation, voluntary and recent donations are parent-teacher associations, neighborhood associations, religious organizations, and environmental organizations. Human rights groups have lower rates of participation, but higher participation-to-donation "yields." Almost three out of four human rights participants are also donors and their

contributions are both voluntary and recent. Still, both participation and donation rates for human rights groups are low; to raise more local funding, this pattern will have to change.

Donation Amounts

We also wanted to know how *much* respondents donated. Thus, when respondents told us they had donated to a specific organization type in the last 12 months, we asked, *how much do you estimate that you donated [in Mexican pesos]?* Since people may not remember the exact amount they donated –or may not wish to reveal it—we offered respondents predefined ranges (see Appendix B for the questionnaire). We found that 50% had donated less than 200 pesos in the past year, 25% had donated 200-500 pesos, and that 25% had donated over 500 pesos. (In early May 2017, 200 Mexican pesos were worth roughly 10.6 USD).

Figure 5.3 Mexico City respondents prefer to give directly to people in need.





To explore the importance of trust in shaping donation preferences, we compared those respondents who preferred to give directly with those who reported high levels of trust in local rights organizations. The results are strong: the *less* people trust local rights groups, the *more* they prefer donating directly to intended beneficiaries. Once again, as we discovered in the focus groups, trust is a key issue.

Family Socialization and Charitable Giving

To learn how more prior socialization and charity affect giving, we asked, "When you were growing up, how often did you hear adults in your house discussing donating money, clothes, or food to people who weren't your family?" Most respondents (56%) remembered family discussions of charity taking place "all the time" (22%) or "sometimes" (34%), while a minority recalled such discussions taking place "rarely (19%) or "never" (25%).

Figure 5.4 Roughly half of Mexico City residents recall some childhood discussions of charity.





This early socialization shapes later donation habits; of those who said they had *always* heard charitable conversations at home, 57% reported having donated money to an organization during the past year. Of those who said their families *never* discussed philanthropic giving, by contrast, only 42% had donated.

Desirable Organizational Attributes


To learn more about what members of the public were looking for in an organization, we asked, "On a scale from 1 to 7....please tell me, when you are deciding whether you like an organization, how important is ______?" Options included 1) "The organization is transparent in its use of resources" 2) "The organization is trustworthy," 3) "The organization helps directly improve the life of people like me," 4) "The organization is well known," 5) "The organization works on changing Mexican laws" (what we've called "strategic advocacy"), 6) "The organization is openly critical of the government" (another "strategic" dimension), 7) having "Met someone working in the organization," and 8) "The organization is endorsed by respected religious leaders."

As Figure 5.5 demonstrates (and as the focus group findings anticipated), the most valued traits were *transparency in using resources* (average importance score of 6.7 points), *trustworthiness* (6.6), and *helping people like themselves* (6.6). Slightly less appreciated characteristics include being *well known* (6.4), *working to change laws* (6.1), and *criticizing the government* (5.1), all of which were above the midpoint. Respondents seemed uninterested in *knowing someone who works at the organization* (4.2) or in *endorsement by religious leaders* (3.7).

Figure 5.5 For Mexico City residents, organizational transparency is most important.

Q (to general public): On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not at all important" and 7 is "very important," please tell me how important are the following when deciding whether you like an organization?

All observations (N) at least 948




Incentivizing Contributions: Matching and Tax Deductibility

We also inquired whether contribution matching schemes and tax deductibility might boost "Please donations. me," we asked, "how likely vou would be to donate money to a human rights organization." We offered two response options: (A) "If your contribution were matched by another person or organization," and (B) "If your contribution were deductible." The tax answers to each were similar (Figure 5.6): 58% would be "very" or "somewhat" likely to donate if their contributions

Figure 5.6 Matching and tax deductibility could boost public donations.

Q (to general public): Please tell me, how likely you would be to donate money to a human rights organization if: a) your contribution were matched by another person or organization, or b) your contribution were tax deductible All observations (N) at least 947



were matched, as would 55% if the sums were tax deductible. Since 45% reported they *had* actually donated at some point, it seems reasonable that more such incentives could boost donations. Still, 24% of respondents were unwilling to donate even if their donation was matched, while 26% would not donate even if the sum was tax deductible.

Reasons for Not Donating


Since most Mexico City adults do not currently donate to local rights organizations, we asked, "People have a lot of good reasons not to donate to human rights organizations. Please tell me if you agree, or disagree, that each of the following reasons is a factor in your not donating." The first cluster of statistically similar reasons include not having sufficient money (86%), lack of organizational transparency in resource use (84%), and organizations not using their money efficiently (82%). Interestingly, however, 79% also said they had not donated because they had never been asked to do so. This finding goes hand-in-hand with the fact that, as illustrated in the first chapter of this report, Mexican rights groups rarely do try to raise money locally.

Respondents also said they did not donate because they do not trust rights groups (71%), never donate to any organization (70%), and do not believe that Mexican rights groups "support people like me" (69%). Some 50% said, moreover, that they had not donated because they "don't know what a human rights organization is."

We asked human rights leaders for *their* explanation of the public's unwillingness to donate, and many correctly cited problems of mistrust and organizational transparency.

Figure 5.7 In Mexico City, the public doesn't donate for many reasons, including "not being asked."

Q (to general public): People have a lot of good reasons not to donate to human rights organizations. Please, using the following reasons, tell me if you agree or disagree with each reason in your particular case?



Conclusion

The data tell us that to boost donations, Mexico City rights organizations must strengthen their financial transparency, trustworthiness, and efficiency. Organizational goals and visibility are also important, but less so. Working with partners to create donation matching schemes and with government to introduce tax deductibility for donations will also help. Most importantly, rights organizations in Mexico City need to systematically *reach out to the general public; build relationships; build opportunities for real public participation; and, finally, strongly and repeatedly* ask *people for their financial support.*

Chapter 6 Survey Experiments: Which Factors Can Boost Public Rights NGO **Donations?**

In the course of our survey, we used two "field experiments" to systematically test the impact of specific factors on respondents' willingness to donate. In our first experiment (termed here the "real money experiment"), we gave 50 Mexican pesos to each respondent, explaining the money was theirs to keep. Giving "incentive payments" of this sort is standard practice in Mexico City consumer surveys. Then, we explained that respondents could choose to donate some, all, or none of that money to a human rights organization, which we then proceeded to describe. We randomly assigned each of the 960 respondents to one of four groups, providing each with a different description of the human rights organization in question. This description, in the language of experimental science, was the "treatment."

In the second experiment (termed here the "choice experiment"), we presented each respondent with two sets of four hypothetical organizations, systematically varying their brand, issue focus, and method of operation. We then asked each respondent to imagine that they had 100 pesos, and to divide that sum among the four groups in each set. Statistically, this procedure helps us examine how different factors affect donations simultaneously, a widely used technique in market research.

Experiment 1: The Real Money Experiment

This experiment was designed to provide a benchmark for respondents' likelihood of donating and to assess how organizations might better target and frame their appeals. We gave each respondent 50 pesos in five-peso coins, explaining that the money was theirs to keep, but they also had an opportunity to donate *some*, all, or *none* of the money to a human rights organization. We described the organization to the respondent, handed her a plastic donation jar, and walked a few steps away. Before turning away, we asked each respondent to put as much money as they wanted in the donation jar while our backs were turned.

To avoid pressuring respondents, we ensured there were coins in the jar when it was handed to respondents and that they were as physically distant from respondents as practical while the donation decision was being made. To provide an incentive for respondents to actually donate, we explained that the organization we were describing was fictitious, but that we would give any donated sums to a real Mexican rights organization.³⁶

Studies on charitable giving are increasingly using field experiments to determine how effective different fundraising campaigns and strategies are in inspiring donations. Many of these studies elicit real contributions, in cash or checks sent by mail or contributions made over the Internet.³⁷ As far as we can determine, though, ours may be one of the only studies involving field-based cash donations. Cash is better than hypothetical donations because it better approximates what respondents might do in a non-experimental setting.³⁸

Of course, we had requested that respondents make donations from cash that we ourselves had already given to them. Since we didn't ask them to dig into their own pockets, the donated amounts should be thought of as the respondents "marginal propensity to donate." Microeconomists speak of the "marginal propensity to consume" as an amount or proportion that a person spends of extra income on top of his or her normal wage. Here, we are measuring how much of an unanticipated income of 50 pesos a survey respondent might donate to a human rights organization. This sum is not negligible, as it represents nearly 70% of the legally stipulated daily minimum wage in Mexico City. About 13.7% of all Mexicans earn minimum wage or less.39

What we are asking, then, is this: if people come into a little extra money, how much might they willing to spend on supporting human rights? What type of organizational messages might increase that amount?

The experiment consisted of varying the way we "framed" the fictitious rights organization to respondents. We alternatively described the organization in question:

1. Neutrally, as a human rights organization that "promotes and defends human rights in Mexico" (Control Group);

³⁶ We donated the money that respondents gave in the experiment to Fundación Origen (http://www.origenac.org/), an NGO dedicated to women's empowerment and crisis intervention.

³⁷ See, e.g., Reeves, Robert A., Ruth Ann Macolini, and Roy C. Martin (1987). "Legitimizing Paltry Contributions: On-the-Spot vs. Mail-In Requests," Journal of Applied Psychology, 17: 731-738, and Borck, Rainald, Bjorn Frank, and Julio Robledo (2006). "An Empirical Analysis of Voluntary Payments for Information Goods on the Internet," Information Economics and Policy, 18: 229-239.

³⁸ See, e.g., Macmillan, Douglas, Trevor S. Smart, and Andrew P. Thorburn (1999). "A Field Experiment Involving Cash and Hypothetical Contributions," Environmental and Resource Economics, 14: 399-412.

³⁹ Anguiano, Adriana (2017). "Quién gana un salario mínimo en México?", *Milenio* (January 15, 2017) [Retrieved January http://www.milenio.com/politica/salario minimo-aumento salario minimo-quien gana un salario minimo 5 353414667.html].

- 2. As fiscally transparent, explaining that 90% of the group's budget went directly to human rights promotion, that it was audited independently, and that it had won international awards for transparency (Transparency Frame);
- 3. As highly effective, noting that the group has documented 10,000 rights abuses, resulting in 1,000 criminal cases and 300 jail terms for rights abusers (Efficacy Frame); or
- 4. As helping an abused individual, recounting a fictional case of a husband, father of four, and labor organizer who was kidnapped and remains missing. The human rights organization in question, we said, helps people like this (Narrative Frame).

These four different descriptions are the experimental frames, emphasizing "a subset of potentially relevant considerations [that] causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions." 40 For example, a debate over a proposed casino could emphasize, positively, "job creation and recreation," or, negatively, "gambling addiction and organized crime." Our experiment seeks to determine which of our four frames does a better job of mobilizing donors.

Frame 1 was the control group, a baseline against which we compared the other three. Frames 2 (Transparency) and 3 (Efficacy) emerged from our focus groups (Chapter 1). As discussed above, many participants told us they were reluctant to donate because they doubted organizations spent the money as claimed. Others were wary of donating to groups that promised much in theory, but delivered few real results.

We derive Frame 4 (Narrative) from research in economics, business, and philanthropy suggesting that fundraisers are often most successful when they tell stories about concrete individuals suffering from specific problems. These stories create empathy in the mind of the listener, helping her to relate to the person in question, and motivating them to take immediate action. 41 Neuroscience has even identified a physiological basis for the power of narrative, arguing that exposure to emotionally powerful stories causes the brain to manufacture oxytocin, an amino acid associated with trust, reciprocity, and pro-social behavior. 42

To test this argument's applicability to the Mexico City context, we wrote a narrative about a Mexican labor organizer who had been kidnapped and disappeared by hooded men ("encapuchados"). His disappearance had severely affected his family emotionally and

⁴⁰ Druckman, James N., and Nelson, Kjersten R. (2003). "Framing and Deliberation." American Journal of Political Science, 47(October), 729–745.

⁴¹ See, e.g., Merchant, Altaf, John B. Ford, and Adrian Sargeant (2010). "Charitable Organizations' Story-Telling Influence on Donors' Emotions and Intentions," Journal of Business Research, 63(2010): 754-762.

⁴² Zak, Paul J. (2015). "Why Inspiring Stories Make Us React: The Neuroscience of Narrative," Cerebrum (February 2015): 1-15.

economically, we said, and the human rights organization in question would help locate him and bring his kidnappers to justice.

Experimental Results

Respondents donated regardless of frame, demographics, political affiliation, and more. Across all four experimental frames, respondents donated 23.3 (± 1.7)⁴³ pesos on average, or roughly 43% of the money we gave them. 44 Only 21% donated nothing at all, and nearly 23% donated all of the 50 pesos. These results suggest that any fundraising efforts by Mexican rights organizations are likely to be beneficial. Nevertheless, we identified several key variables that will allow local groups to implement more successful campaigns.

The Right Message

The most effective frames were financial transparency and efficacy. Respondents exposed to the **Transparency Frame** donated, on average, 4 pesos (± 1.6) more than the control group's average of 21.6, while those exposed to the Efficacy Frame donated 2.7 pesos (±1.6) more. 45 The Narrative Frame did not increase donations, surprisingly, possibly because Mexico City residents are inured to grim stories. 46 Figure 6.0 presents these results graphically.

⁴³ The figures in parenthesis with the plus-or-minus signs—e.g., (±1.6)—are a plausible range in which the donation might fall. All statistics are estimates based on just a sample of the population, not the full population. Estimates are just that: estimates. They always entail some uncertainty, and the true number may be lower or higher. Our "plausible range" attempts to say just how much lower or higher. So, the \$4.07 increase we estimate for the Transparency condition could, according to our best guess, be as high as \$5.67 or as low as \$3.47. In technical terms, the plausible range falls between one standard error above, and one standard error below, the estimated amount, where standard error is the average amount by which a typical respondent in the **Transparency** group is off from \$4.07.


⁴⁴ The figures in parenthesis with the plus-or-minus signs—e.g., (±1.6)—are a plausible range in which the donation might fall.

⁴⁵ See Appendix C for a full table of our results.

⁴⁶ Note, however, that for ethical reasons, we emphasized that the story of an abused person was fictional. This may have influenced our results.

Frames were not the only factors shaping donations, however. Respondents who told us that human rights in Mexico were not respected "at all" gave a modest 2.8 pesos (± 2.3) more than people who thought they were respected "a lot." (Given the margin of error, we are less confident in this finding). Logically, this makes sense, suggesting that rights groups should continue to remind people of their country's rights problems. We also found, unsurprisingly, that

Figure 6.0 The transparency and efficacy frames boost public donations.



people who care "a lot" either about violations of physical integrity rights (forced disappearances and crime victimization) social about economic rights (health and education) care donated $4.00 (\pm 2.2)$ and 5.6 (± 3.2) more, respectively, than people who cared about these issues "not at all."

Overall, these results suggest that when NGOs

craft the "right message," they can significantly boost the public's donations. Donation appeals that emphasize an NGO's fiscal transparency and concern for severe abuses of physical integrity *or* socio-economic rights lead to an increase of 42% in donations, relative to messages lacking these elements.

The Right Donor

Even greater gains are to be had for those NGOs that correctly identify and locate the most likely potential donors. Though some studies have shown higher-income individuals donate more money to charitable causes, others—including our own research—demonstrate that the poor also give. What matters, it seems, is how people *perceive* their incomes relative to expenses. Persons with the same income may feel more or less economically constrained, depending on their lifestyles and expectations.

To study the effects of perceived wealth, we asked respondents them to choose from the following regarding their household income: "My income can cover expenses and I can save," "My income can just cover expenses, without major difficulties;" "My income cannot cover expenses, and I have difficulties;" or "My income cannot cover expenses, and I have major

difficulties." Respondents who reported feeling the poorest donated $6.62~(\pm 2.5)$ pesos less than those who told us they felt most economically comfortable. Still, even among those facing "great economic difficulties" the mean donation was roughly 17.8 pesos. Statistical analysis suggests that our measures of "subjective income" were one of the most important donation predictors. Although rights NGOs cannot *directly* target people with high subjective incomes, they can get close by focusing on observable indicators, such as household assets.

To construct an asset-based measure of objective wealth, we asked respondents about the number of cars they owned; their access to potable water; and their ownership of computers, microwaves, televisions, washing machines, mobile phones, landline phones, and light bulbs. The average donation from the poorest third of the asset index was 20 pesos (±18), while the average donation for the wealthiest third was 26 pesos (±17). Yet, while "objectively" wealthy people do donate more, 73% of people in the poorest third of the index donated at least *some* of the money we gave them. Furthermore, when controlling for assets, people living in some of the poorest communities of Mexico City tended to donate more. Thus, respondents in Milpa Alta and Xochimilco, two of the city's *delegaciones* (major administrative subunits) with the lowest GDP per capita, donated 12 and 7 pesos more, respectively, than those in wealthiest *delegación* (Benito Juárez, not shown in Appendix C).

Other non-economic factors also matter, including formal education, as respondents with a college education donated 28 pesos (± 1.8), on average, while those with no formal education donated only 19 (± 1.9). Although education and income are tightly correlated, some 37% of college-educated respondents were located in the bottom two thirds of the asset index, suggesting again that organizations must not focus their fundraising exclusively on the wealthiest.

One way for local rights groups to reach highly educated people would be to target the audiences of either print or online news. This, in turn, would facilitate NGO access to people with greater political knowledgeable, which—measured by responses to questions about national and international issues—were also correlated with greater donations.⁴⁷ Controlling for education and other factors, respondents scoring highest on the political knowledge index donated nearly 5 pesos more than those scoring the least. Finally, local rights groups would do well to reach out to people who have already donated at least once to a human rights organization. On average, these prior donors donated roughly 7 (±3.2) pesos more than those who had never donated before.

In short, local rights groups in Mexico City will receive more money from the public if they focus their fundraising efforts on the "right donors": people with greater wealth, formal education, political knowledge, and a prior history of donating. By focusing on people who score

⁴⁷ Political knowledge questions included knowing the meaning of the acronym "FIFA," the local governor's name, the name of the United States president, and the currency of the European Union.

highly on these factors, rights NGOs can expect an average donation that 64% larger than if they targeted all members of the public equally. In the real money experiment, people who fit this description donated about 37 of the 50 pesos we had initially given them.

These sums are *not* the amounts rights NGOs should expect of hypothetical "ideal donors," however. These, and all other potential donors, will have different amounts of money available to them when asked to contribute. Rather, 37 pesos (like all the other figures presented here) is the respondent's "marginal propensity to donate" from every 50 pesos of extra income. That is, these donation amounts are based on a "windfall" of 50 pesos; if other windfalls are higher or lower, we should expect donations to vary accordingly.

Finally, we note that the marginal gain from crafting the "right message" is smaller than the gain involved in targeting the "right donor." As noted above, an effective message increases donations by about 42%, while reaching the right donors boosts giving by 64%. Figure 6.1 shows this comparison graphically for people located in each third of the asset index. In each category, the expected donation from the "right donor" is higher than that expected from the "right message." On the other hand, the cost involved in designing the "right message" is probably much smaller than the data-intensive efforts required to locate the "right donors."

Figure 6.1 Identifying the "right donor" yields more donations than crafting the "right message"

■ Right Target

Right Message



Beyond Messaging and Donors

Other factors also influence donations. Female survey enumerators, for example, received roughly 3.1 pesos (±1.3) more than males; people with high trust in local rights groups donated 3.65 pesos (± 2.1) more than those who had no trust; and people associating "human rights organizations" with positive traits, such as being effective, being connected to people's needs, and brave, donated \$7.4 pesos (± 2.2) more than those who did not. Clearly, local rights groups could reap economic benefits from strengthening their reputations locally.

Experiment 2: The Choice Experiment

In our second experiment, we presented each respondent with two large cards, each of which listed four hypothetical organizations. We then asked respondents to distribute 100 imaginary pesos among each card's groups (termed a "choice set"). We systematically rotated the organizational attributes within each set. We selected 16 respondents from each of the 60 Mexico City census tracts we surveyed, and respondents in each received a total of 32 different choice sets (16 x 2). 48 We repeated this design, offering the same choice sets, in all of the 60 census tracts we surveyed, varying organizations by three attributes: "brand," "issue," and "activity."

"Brand" denotes the sponsor, or the legitimating ideology, of the organization in question. By systematically varying brand, we learn how Mexico City residents view donations to organizations branded as "human rights NGOs," regardless of the specific issue they work on. We compared the effects of three other widely known brands: 1) the **religious brand**, which we defined in our choice sets as an "organization of lay Catholics"; 2) the social movement brand, which we defined as "a movement of Mexican citizens"; and 3) the corporate brand, defined by us as "a Mexican organization of business leaders." We compared the effect of each of these brands to that of the human rights brand, defined simply as "a human rights organization."

Our second attribute, "issue," denotes a specific area or focus of work. By systematically varying issues, we learn which type of rights work Mexico City residents are most likely to support financially. In our choice sets, we systematically rotated four different issues: 1) LGBT issues; 2) women's equality; 3) access to potable water; and 4) forced disappearances.

⁴⁸ This is a slight modification of what is known in economics as a "discrete choice experiment," and in marketing, as "choice-based conjoint." The modification lies in asking respondents to distribute money among the groups, whereas a true choice experiment would request that respondents choose one of the four groups.

Our third attribute, "activity," denotes the style of work adopted by the organization in question. By alternating between two activity types, we were able to learn whether respondents preferred to donate to organizations that 1) **provided direct relief** to persons in need, or 2) **engaged in government-focused advocacy**. In each case, we adjusted the precise wording to suit the issue in question. Our different descriptions of organizations engaged in direct relief activities, for example, included "providing potable water to those without access" or "providing economic help to support women's progress." Descriptions of government-focused advocacy, to take another example, included "pressuring the authorities to punish discrimination against gay, lesbian, and transgender persons" or "pressuring authorities to punish forced disappearances." For a full list of the brand/issue/activity descriptions, see Appendix D.

We phrased a typical choice set in the following manner:

We are going to give you two lists of hypothetical organizations. Imagine you have 100 pesos to distribute between the four organizations on each of these lists. Please distribute these 100 pesos as you like. The organizations are [ENUMERATOR PRESENTS SHOWCARD 1]:

Option 1: A movement of Mexican citizens that gives economic support to gay, lesbian, and transgender persons.

Option 2: An organization of Mexican lay Catholics that pressures authorities to punish discrimination against gay, lesbian, and transgender persons.

Option 3: An organization of Mexican business leaders that pressures authorities to punish discrimination against women.

Option 4: A Mexican human rights organization that pressures authorities to punish discrimination against women.

There are 32 possible combinations (four brands x four issues x two activities). We randomized these with the help of a computer program, ensuring that each attribute (brand, issue, and activity) appeared an equal number of times in the 32 choice sets used in each of the 60 census tracts.

Results of the Second Experiment

As Figure 6.2 demonstrates, the human rights and social movement "brands" attracted the most financial support. Controlling for issue and activity, survey respondents donated an average of

26.3 and 28 pesos to these organizations, numbers that statistically identical, given the size of our sample. Next in line were donations to groups with the corporate brand at 22 pesos $(\pm .65)$, while donations to groups run bv "lay Catholics"—the religious brand - were the lowest at 19.8 pesos $(\pm .61)$. 49 The strong performance of the human rights should be encouraging to Mexican rights groups.50

Figure 6.2
Religious and social movement "brands" inspire the most donations.




Of the four issue areas we evaluated, groups working on *access to potable water* and *women's rights* attracted the highest donations, at 28.5 (\pm .66) and 27.6 (\pm .63) pesos, respectively (once again, these averages are statistically indistinguishable). Donations to organizations working on *forced disappearances* trailed at 24.5 (\pm .65), followed by donations to groups working on LGBT issues, at 15.7 (\pm .57), as seen in Figure 6.3. This rank ordering is broadly consistent with the public's trust in different types of human rights organizations and rank-ordering of human rights issues.

⁴⁹ The numbers don't add up to 100 because several respondents chose not to allocate the full amount.

⁵⁰ The poor performance of the religious brand is surprising, given Mexicans' high trust in religious organizations. This may partly be explained by the fact that Mexico City residents trust religious organizations less than people living elsewhere in the country (see Figure 4.0 above).

Finally, respondents donated slightly more (2.1)money pesos $[\pm .69]$), on average, to organizations providing direct economic needy support to compared to persons, groups engaged in government-oriented advocacy. Although difference this statistically significant, is substantively small.

Figure 6.3
Access to potable water and women's rights inspire the most donations.



Conclusion: Experimental Results

Taken together, our "real money" and "choice" experiments suggest that Mexican rights groups can, in fact, raise money from the general public. The evidence indicates that donations are likely to be boosted by appropriate communications (the "right message") with the appropriate publics (the "right donors"). The public's regard for the human rights brand is high, and this is something local rights groups can, over time, successfully "monetize." These fundraising efforts will be helped by emphasizing the NGOs' trustworthiness and transparency as well as their efficacy. If local rights groups can persuade Mexico City residents that their money will be wisely and effectively used, the public is willing to donate more than Mexican rights leaders currently think.

Chapter 7 **Research Methods**

The NGO leaders' survey

From April to July 2016, we conducted 34 in-depth interviews with the leaders of rights organizations based in Mexico City. To devise a sampling frame of locally based groups, we began with the list we first created in 2012 for an earlier study.⁵¹ From there, a researcher from our collaborating institution, FLACSO, reviewed and revised the list, defining "local human rights NGOs" as organizations with headquarters in Mexico City and whose objectives are to promote human rights, as identified via the organizations' webpages. From that larger list, we selected 40 organizations that fulfilled one of the following three criteria: 1) they had signed on to the main demands of national platform on human rights, 2) were located in the NGO directory for the Federal District Commission of Human Rights, or 3) had participated in the inter-American human rights system in special sessions or cases.

We emailed the resulting 40 organizations a formal letter, in Spanish, on University of Minnesota letterhead, explaining the project and requesting an interview. Of these, 34 (85%) agreed to participate, and we interviewed their leaders in person, typically at their offices.

We created and administered the NGO leader survey with Qualtrics, an online survey platform, using a tablet to record responses with the Qualtrics offline app. We showed respondents the questionnaire on the tablet screen as they were being interviewed and as we recorded responses, ensuring transparency.

This portion of the study did not require University of Minnesota IRB approval.

General Public Survey⁵²

We contracted the Mexican survey company, DATA-OPM, for this survey. In June 2016, DATA-OPM, CIDE and UMN staff trained enumerators and monitored a pilot of 100 face-toface interviews. We then refined our survey instrument and sampling methods, and proceeded with 960 face-to-face interviews with adults aged 18 or older who resided in Mexico City. We drew on the sampling frame from the Electoral Selections (ES) defined by Mexico's Instituto

⁵¹ Ron. J., S. Golden, A. Pandya, S. Peek, L. Sparling, & D.Crow. 2014. "The Human Rights Sector in Mexico: Evidence from Activists, the Public and Elites," The Human Rights Organizations Project, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota.

⁵² Adapted from DATA-OPM technical report.

Nacional Electoral, using multistage sampling in which the ES was the primary sampling unit (PSU).

For the first stage of the survey, we ordered all PSUs in descending order by number of registered voters. From there, we randomly selected a "start seed" from the first cluster⁵³ of PSUs, and then systematically chose⁵⁴ an additional 29 points within additional PSU clusters. In the survey's second stage, we randomly selected four blocks from each PSU, terming these blocks as our secondary sampling unit (SSU). In each of these four SSUs, we completed a maximum of four interviews, for a total of 16 interviews per PSU. We chose the SSUs at random, using a catalog of blocks provided by the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografia (INEGI). In the third stage of the sampling process, we treated households as our tertiary sampling units (TSUs). We began with TSUs located at the northwest corner of each SSU, and then searched for four households in the SSU where there was at least one resident aged 18 years or older.

Although we had originally planned to select individuals for interview using the systematic "last birthday" method, we jettisoned this plan during the pilot because surveyors could not find sufficient numbers of interview subjects. We were also forced to abandon our planned "callback" procedure due to the city's traffic size, which dramatically boosted the cost of returning to selected homes multiple times.

At the recommendation of our survey company, we moved to a quota system for respondent selection modeled on INEGI's Census of Population and Housing. Our gender quota was 50% male and 50% female; our age quotas were 30% for individuals aged 18-29; 40% for individuals aged 30-49; and 30% for individuals 50 years and over.

Trained surveyors conducted all interviews face-to-face, using pen and paper, typically in the entryway of the respondent's home. We chose not to use tablets during this portion of the survey so as to enhance surveyor security; crime is a persistent problem in Mexico City.

We obtained University of Minnesota IRB approval for this portion of the study.

⁵³ Clusters were formed from subsets of PSUs (electoral sections) corresponding to the divisor of total number of voters in the sampling frame. Sampling (or starting) points are chosen from the electoral sections. For example, let's say we need 10 starting points. The total number of voters is organized in electoral sections (for example, 2 million voters organized in 4 million electoral sections)—this is the universe; 10 starting points will eventually be selected from the universe. The number of voters are divided by the number of starting points (in this example, 2million/10). So in this example, we would have 10 clusters with approximately 200,000 voters each.

⁵⁴ Within the first cluster of voters, a random number is chosen to select any voter in the cluster, (if we use the example from footnote 53, it would be between the number 1 and 200,000 because there are 200,000 voters in the cluster). Let's say voter number 2547 is chosen; this voter is in a specific electoral section (e.g. 423). In the following 9 clusters (remember, we originally had 10), wherever voter 2547 is located will be selected as the starting point. The "seed," in this example, was voter number 2546 that was randomly drawn from the first cluster. This will now be the starting point in the rest of the clusters.

Chapter 8 LHRO Workshop, February 2017, Mexico City

On February 2, 2017, we invited all 34 of the Mexican rights organizations that had participated in our NGO leader study to attend a five-hour meeting on the FLACSO Mexico campus. Nineteen of these groups sent senior leaders to the meeting, for a total of 21 NGO participants. According to a post-meeting anonymous survey (N=13, a response rate of 62%), participants found the workshop to be quite useful.

We structured the meeting in two parts. We first presented our findings with visuals, and then divided participants into small groups, each of which was led by a UMN or CIDE team member.

Before the meeting began, we had sent out a short survey to learn which human rights issue participants wanted to learn about most. They chose women's rights, and our team conducted a basic analysis of the pertinent survey data, allowing us to demonstrate how rights NGOs could use our survey to ask questions about public support for this issue. Participants asked additional questions during the workshop, and we answered on the spot by running the analysis in STATA. Our goal was to "demystify" survey data while also showing the utility of an evidenced-based approach.

The post-meeting survey told us that respondents felt the conference was useful, 55 that their understanding of survey data for human rights work had improved,⁵⁶ that they found the survey results interesting, and that they would be interested in attending a longer workshop. All respondents felt their organizations could use our data in fundraising, advocacy campaigns, and strategic planning.⁵⁷ Importantly, most (85%) said they would likely start to solicit funds from donors to build their own capacity to use our survey data. However, most respondents also said that they were not likely to ask for money to run their own surveys. Thus, while respondents find our data useful, they are not willing to do their own data collection. This is unsurprising, given the expense and complexity of survey research.

In addition to gaining insight on what the attendees gained from the conference, we also found it important to understand how we did as an organization in disseminating and presenting the

⁵⁵ When asked how useful the conference was on a scale of 1 and 7, where 1 is "not at all useful" and 7 is "very useful", 92% of respondents rated the conference of 5 (n=1), 6 (n=4), or 7 (7) in usefulness

⁵⁶ When asked how much their understanding of the survey data work for human right has improved, 85% of respondents said their understanding had improved "some" (39%) or "a lot" (46%).

⁵⁷ When asked how useful this survey data is on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not at all useful" and 7 is "very useful," 85%, 77%, and 85% of respondents rated the data a 5 of above in usefulness for campaigns, fundraising, and strategic planning, respectively.

information. Overall, respondents felt we presented the information clearly,⁵⁸ that we understood the challenges their organizations faced,⁵⁹ and that our team was respectful of the conditions they faced in Mexico City. 60 Lastly, 85% said they would be interested in working with our team to develop new, evidence-based funding and advocacy strategies.

⁵⁸ When asked how clearly the data and findings were presented on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not at all clearly" and 7 "very clearly", 100% of respondent rated the clarity either 6 (54%) or 7 (46%).

⁵⁹ When asked how much our academic understood the challenges facing human rights NGOs in Mexico City on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "no understanding" and 7 is "a lot of understanding," 85% rated the academic team's understanding as 5 (38%), 6 (15%), or 7 (31%).

⁶⁰ When asked how much respect our academic team had for the conditions face human rights organizations in Mexico City on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "no respect" and 7 is "a lot of respect", 100% of respondents rated the academic team's respect 5 (8%), 6 (8%), or 7 (85%)—not equal to 100% due to rounding.

Chapter 9 **Face-to-Face Collaboration, Summer 2017**

During the summer of 2017, two Mexican graduate students based at the University of Minnesota—Andrea Daniela Martinez and José Kaire -will spend three months in Mexico City working with local organizations and our survey data to develop evidence-based strategies. They will work with individual groups to identify the target audience most likely to support their work (the "right donors"), and help identify the type of messages that might resonate the most (the "right message"). We expect them to work with 7-10 organizations over the summer.

Before leaving for Mexico City, the graduate students are holding preliminary meetings with interested groups via Skype, and researching methods used by other organizations worldwide to raise local funds.

We will update this section of the report once their work is completed.

Chapter 10: **Conclusions**

Raising money for NGO rights work in Mexico City is a distinct possibility. Although Mexico City residents do not currently donate heavily to local rights organizations, they do give to other institutions, and are generally well disposed towards human rights work. Indeed, our data suggest the existence of an untapped willingness to donate for human rights work, which local NGOs can take advantage of by targeting potential donors properly and designing solicitation campaigns that emphasize organizational honesty, transparency, and efficacy.

Trust is perhaps the most important factor. Although many Mexico City residents do trust local human rights groups overall, many fear these groups are corrupt, elitist, or out-of-touch. Thus, a central task for all Mexico City rights groups is to establish themselves as worthy repositories of people's confidence and money.

Recommendations to Mexico City's NGOs

- Build trust. Maximize your transparency about how you spend your money, including publishing your budgets, salaries, and expenses on-line. Get independent and external audits, and have those be routinely publicized, online. Correct the things you need to correct, and publicize your transparency.
- Adjust your goals so that you can actually achieve what you promise. Once you have shown yourselves to be effective, emphasize this in fundraising appeals.
- Stories of individual suffering are not effective. As empathetic as Mexicans may be, they have become immune to emotional appeals. Instead, focus on concrete achievements and transparency.
- Target your donors among the public. Start by figuring out where better-off, bettereducated potential donors are, and then move out further from there.
- Don't neglect the middle and lower social strata. They want to, and do, participate and give money.
- Advertise and, better yet, take up collections in places likely to attract people concerned with current events and politics, such as demonstrations. Reach out to people concerned with social justice crowd through publications they read, and places they frequent. Those

who are knowledgeable about politics, and who emphasize the socioeconomic justice dimension of human rights, are more likely to donate.

- Get out and meet people. Relatively few Mexico City inhabitants have met someone who works in a local human rights organization, but this contact is crucial.
- Emphasize gender issues in your appeals, without deviating from your core mission, as NGOs working on women's issues attract more donations.
- Ask for donations. Many people don't donate simply because they haven't been asked.
- Find out who's already donated. Keep accurate, up-to-date, detailed lists of donors. Share donor lists among human rights organizations (but also create and respect a policy for data privacy).
- If possible, get institutional donors to match individual contributions.
- Work with the authorities to make donations to your organization tax deductible.
- Help create a culture among the young not only of philanthropy, but of strategic giving to organizations working on systemic change. Talk about donating with young people, in schools and other pertinent venues. This may not yield immediate gains, but will have impacts down the road.

Further Research

Scientific research is a cumulative process, and the more studies that point to the same conclusions, the more credible those conclusions are. That's especially important in this case, since the public's willingness to donate to human rights work in the global South is uncharted water.

The first step would be to replicate these results using a variety of additional research methods. Surveys have strengths and weaknesses. They allow us to ask about many topics and analyze relationships between issues, but survey researchers always rely on respondents to answer questions accurately; to recall how much they have donated, or to be honest about whether they really trust LHROs. Our internal reliability checks, such as asking survey respondents to say how much other people trust LHROs, give us confidence in our findings. Still, more surveys pointing to similar results would make us even more confident.

Similarly, experiments—the gold standard of scientific research—also have drawbacks. Giving people money and asking them to donate some of it poses a genuine dilemma: people want to be generous, but many could also use the money for other purposes. As such, the "real money" experiment tests people's willingness to donate in a real, concrete sense. It's also a somewhat artificial situation, however: even if we accept that the real money experiment measures people's "marginal propensity to donate" from unanticipated income, would they donate just as much if they found a \$50-peso note on the ground? Likewise, our "choice experiment" can give us a good idea of how various organizational attributes such as "brand" and "issue" increase or decrease potential donations, but they cannot give us a concrete idea of how much, precisely, people will donate.

More research, surveys, and experiments are needed, using a variety of methods, including doorto-door canvassers from actual organizations using real pamphlets, donations boxes at supermarkets, and collecting information about real donors and amounts. The possibilities are endless, but the main goal is confirm, disconfirm, and put our results to the test in a variety of research settings. Further research is also required in different locales. Although Mexico City is an excellent test case, what works here might not travel well to other places.

One particularly challenging result of this study was the conflicting attitudes people seem to have about local rights groups. Mexico City citizens generally support rights and rights defenders, yet some view LHROs as corrupt and elitist. Are these the same people? If so, are there a set of circumstances in which a single person could hold apparently conflicting attitudes simultaneously? The answers might come from further, more detailed analysis of the data, but they might also come from probing with further survey questions.

We also need more information on where respondents get their information on LHROs? News media, interpersonal conversations, and direct contact with NGOs all play a role, but we don't know exactly what that role is. We know that expressions of civic trust are meaningful because they correlate with other attitudes and behaviors, but we do not fully understand how citizens come to regard LHROs, and civic organizations generally as trustworthy.

Perhaps the most important task is for NGOs to track, systematically, and in detail, how their local fundraising efforts pan out. All of us, researchers and practitioners alike, are barely on the ground floor. We have yet to see how high the building will go.

Appendix

For the extended Appendix, please see: https://jamesron.com/policy-engagements-reports/

Appendix A. Focus Group Guide (English)

Focus Group Agenda

Two groups

- 1. From within the giving zone
- 2. Outside the giving zone

Time: Approximately 1.5 hours

Key Issues

- 1. Concepts of charitable giving
- 2. Mapping current giving
- 3. Potential landscape of giving
- 4. Giving to human rights
- 5. Two local organization

Welcome (Moderator)

Thank you for agreeing to join us today for our focus group. We appreciate your willingness to participate. I have been asked by the University of Minnesota and CIDE to facilitate this focus group. We are holding this focus group in order to understand charitable giving behavior and beliefs of Mexican citizens. Your input is very important and this is a confidential space, and we want you to share your honest thoughts with us.

Ground Rules

There are no right or wrong answers, just different perspectives, so please do not hesitate to participate or share your thoughts if it differs from another participant's. We are interested in what you have to say, whether it is negative or positive—any thoughts you provide will help us. Remember, information is confidential. Additionally, we are video recording this session because we don't want to miss anyone's comments. The recording is strictly for our own use; we will not show it or play it back to anybody else Although we will be using first names tonight, no names will be present in any of the reports as there is, as stated earlier, complete confidentiality. Once the project is completed, we will share the results report with you.

Introductions

Easy opener questions:

- What is your first name [we will not track last names in transcripts]?
- What do you do? (student/job/etc.)

Questions:

Concepts of Charitable Giving

- 1. What is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the term "charity"? How about "donating"?
 - Probes: donating time (i.e. volunteering), money, and goods (such as clothes/food)
- 2. Do you ever discuss the notion of charitable giving in your family, or in your place of work? If so, how often, and in what ways?

Mapping Current Giving

- 3. If you have ever donated/given time, money or goods, think back to the last time you donated. Who did you donate to?
 - Probes: Family? Organization? Friends? Parent-teacher association? Political party? Religious group or church?
- 4. When you say donate, does this include more or less obligatory fees, membership dues,
- 5. How did you choose them?
 - Probes: Recommendation (friend/family/etc.), you met a representative of the organization, the news, social media, personal connection
- 6. How often/at what time of year do you give this this, or similar types of organizations?
- 7. If you have never donated time, money, or goods, please share why you have been unable or chosen not to donate.
 - Probes: money, time, don't know how, mistrust
- 8. When you give money, how do you do it—i.e., what mechanism do you use to actually transfer the money—that is, when you give money, how do you do it? Cash, check, mail, credit card, Internet, supermarket checkout, automatic teller machine.

Potential Landscape of Giving

- 9. Regardless of whether you have donated to an organization, if you had to choose an organization to give to, what characteristics of an organization would influence your decision?
 - Probes: Trust, transparency, communication, political affiliation, reputation in community, religious-based, goals achieved
- 10. What issues are you most willing to donate money to?
 - Probe: Does a personal connection to the issue, or to the organization, matter?
 - o E.g., Are people whose mothers had breast cancer more likely to contribute to organizations working on that issue?

Giving to Human Rights Organizations

- 11. When you think of the term, "human rights organization," what type of group comes to mind? Do you think of any specific organizations or government agencies?
- 12. What would make you more likely to donate to a human rights organization?
 - Probes: an organization sponsored by your church/some church or temple? High media profile? Service versus advocacy? Political party connections?

Closing

Is there anything else you would like to add? Have we missed anything in our discussion that you feel is important to the goal of the focus group?

MODERATOR GIVES CLOSING STATEMENT.

Appendix B. General Public Survey Questionnaire (English)

PUBLIC SURVEY (N=960)⁶¹ Non-Profit Organizations, Donations, and Issues in Mexico City -**Attitudes and Behaviors**

Good morning/afternoon/evening.
My name is I work for Data-OPM, an independent firm that studies that opinion of people like yourself. We want to learn your opinion regarding the situation in this country. We have been hired to do this by the Mexican university, el Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), and the U.S. University of Minnesota. We would like to request 30 minutes of your time.
Your answers will remain confidential and anonymous, and will only be used for scientific research. Additionally, this is not an exam. We are looking for YOUR OPINION; there are no correct or incorrect answers.
Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you may choose not to answer any of the questions lask.
Please read the following form carefully, which describes our project in greater detail.
Now that you have read this form, are you willing to participate in this survey?
• Yes
• No
Thank you. Please keep this form in case you'd like to ask any questions at a later date.
1. DISCRETE CHOICE EXPERIMENTS [DON'T READ] 1.1 Now we are going to give you TWO lists of four hypothetical organizations and ask you to imagine that you have 100 pesos. After learning about these organizations, please distribute the 100 pesos between the four organizations. The organizations are [ENUMERATOR PRESENTS SHOWCARD 1]:
[SetNo 1]:
Option 1 is an organization that Option 2 is an organization that

⁶¹ This draft is for the pilot, dated June 10, 2016. There may be small changes after the pilot. Please note that all response options include "don't know" and "prefer not to answer." For brevity's sake, we do not always include them here, but the survey company will add when they format the questionnaire form.

Option 3 is an organization that... **Option 4** is an organization that...

Now please distribute the 100 pesos between these four organizations. [RECORD] **RESPONSES BELOW].**

OPTION 1	
• \$	[WRITE EXACT AMOUNT]
OPTION 2	,
• \$	[WRITE EXACT AMOUNT]
OPTION 3	·
• \$	[WRITE EXACT AMOUNT]
OPTION 4	
• \$	[WRITE EXACT AMOUNT]
• (997) [DI]	D NOT WANT TO DONATE TO ANY ORGANIZATION
WRITE "0" IN A	LL THE BLANKS]
• (998) DON	V'T KNOW [DON'T READ]
• (999) REF	USED [DON'T READ]
`	•

1.2 Now we are going to read the second list of organization. After learning about these organizations, please distribute the 100 pesos between the four organizations. The organizations are [ENUMERATOR PRESENTS SHOWCARD 2]:

[SetNo 2]:

Option 1 is an organization that...

Option 2 is an organization that...

Option 3 is an organization that...

Option 4 is an organization that...

Now please distribute the 100 pesos between these four organizations. [RECORD] RESPONSES BELOW].

OPTION 1 • \$ [WRITE EXACT AMOUNT] OPTION 2 • \$ [WRITE EXACT AMOUNT] OPTION 3 [WRITE EXACT AMOUNT] OPTION 4 • \$ [WRITE EXACT AMOUNT] [DID NOT WANT TO DONATE TO ANY ORGANIZATION. WRITE "0" IN ALL THE BLANKS DON'T KNOW [DON'T READ] REFUSED [DON'T READ]

2. REAL MONEY EXPERIMENT

[ENUMERATOR: ENSURE THERE IS ALWAYS 20 PESOS IN THE CAN BEFORE **BEGINNING THE EXPERIMENT**

2.1. [Organization type here: Control/Transparency/Efficacy/Narrative] [DON'T **READ**]

[Enumerator reads one of four treatments depending on questionnaire version] [ENUMERATOR GIVES 50 PESOS TO RESPONDENT]

1. CONTROL [DON'T READ]

I am going to give you 50 pesos. You can donate all or part to the following organization or keep all the money for yourself and your family. Thinking of the importance of this organization's work, but also taking into account that this is YOUR MONEY AND YOU CAN USE IT HOWEVER YOU WOULD LIKE, please decide an amount you would like to donate—including not donating at all and keep the rest for yourself. We will donate any donated money to a real organization committed to defending human rights.

I am going to give you the can and walk away for a few moments. [ENUMERATOR STEPS AWAY/TURNS BACK TO RESPONDENT]

2. TRANSPARENCY [DON'T READ]

Now I would like you to imagine an organization dedicated to promoting and defending human rights. The organization spends 90% on direct activities to promote rights, and 10% on staff salaries and rent. The organization is audited every year by an independent agency and has won international awards for being the most transparent national organization.

I am going to give you 50 pesos. You can donate all or part to the following organization or keep all the money for yourself and your family. Thinking of the importance of this organization's work, but also taking into account that this is YOUR MONEY AND YOU CAN USE IT HOWEVER YOU WOULD LIKE, please decide an amount you would like to donate—including not donating at all—and keep the rest for yourself. We will donate any donated money to a real organization committed to defending human rights.

I am going to give you the can and walk away for a few moments. [ENUMERATOR STEPS AWAY/TURNS BACK TO RESPONDENT]

3. EFFICACY [DON'T READ]

Now I would like you to imagine an organization dedicated to promoting and defending human rights. The organization has documented over 10,000 abuses of human

rights. Their work has led to a 1000 criminal cases filed against rights abusers and has put approximately 300 rights abusers in prison.

I'm going to give you \$50 pesos. You can either donate some or all of the money to the organization or keep it for yourself and your family. I'm going to give you a jar and walk away for a few minutes. Thinking about how important the organization's work is, understanding you may be unable to donate because of your family's needs, I'd like you to donate however much you can or want to—including nothing at all—and keep the rest. We will donate this money to a real organization similar to the one described here.

I am going to give you the can and walk away for a few moments. [ENUMERATOR STEPS AWAY/TURNS BACK TO RESPONDENT]

4. Narrative

I would like you to imagine a hypothetical organization dedicated to promoting and defending human rights. Now imagine a fictitious person, Juan Méndez Cruz. A good husband and father of four, Juan organized a strike two years ago. After, masked men broke into his house late at night and kidnapped him. No one has seen him since. The family is left in a very difficult economic situation. The children no longer have a father. A human rights organization such as the one you imaged is pressuring authorities to find the people responsible for his disappearance. Your donation will help Juan Méndez Cruz and people like him.

I'm going to give you \$50 pesos. You can either donate some or all of the money to the organization or keep it for yourself and your family. I'm going to give you a jar and walk away for a few minutes. Thinking about how important the organization's work is, but understanding you may be unable to donate because of your family's needs, I'd like you to donate however much you can or want to—including nothing at all—and keep the rest. We will donate this money to a real organization similar to the one described here.

[ENUMERATOR RECEIVES CANISTER AND THANKS THE RESPONDENT; AFTER FINSISHING THE INTERVIEW AND WHEN OUT OF SIGHT OF THE RESPONDENT, COUNT THE DONATION AND NOTE THE AMOUNT ON THE LAST PAGE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

3. GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS AND HR ORGANIZATIONS

- 3.1. There are many important human rights issues. For some people, some issues will be more important than others. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not important" and 7 is "very important," how important is each of the following issues to you?
 - Women's equality
 - Violence against women
 - Abuses committed by the army or the police
 - 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Government corruption
 - Victims of crimes
 - LGBT rights
 - Forced disappearance
 - Central American migrants
 - Access to clean water
 - Guaranteeing a minimum income for all
 - Ensuring healthcare for all 11.
 - Ensuring basic education for all
- 3.2. On a scale of 0 to 100; with 0 being very unfavorable feelings, 100 being very favorable, and 50 being neither a favorable nor unfavorable, what are your feelings towards the following organizations? If you have no feelings towards the organization, or do not know the organization, please say so. You may choose 0, 100, or any number in between. [ROTATE]
 - A. The United Nations Organizations
 - B. Amnesty International
 - C. Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos
 - D. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
- 3.3. Please tell me how much trust you place on the following institutions, groups or persons: A lot of trust, some trust, a little trust, or no trust at all [ROTATE]
 - A. General population
 - B. The police
 - C. Politicians
 - D. The army
 - E. Mexican human rights organizations
 - F. The President Enrique Peña Nieto
 - G. The United States government
 - H. Judges
 - I. Banks
 - J. Multinational companies
 - K. International human rights organizations
 - L. Mexican companies
 - M. Religious institutions
 - N. Social movements
 - O. Unions

- 3.4. Now, thinking of PEOPLE OTHER than yourself, please tell me how much, in your opinion, <u>other people</u> trust Mexican human rights organizations: a lot, somewhat, a little, or not at all.
 - <u>1.</u> A lot
 - 2. Somewhat
 - 3. A little
 - 4. Not at all
 - 5. Don't know
 - 6. Refused/Prefer not to answer
- 3.5. Now, I would like to know how much you trust human rights organizations working on specific issues in Mexico. Please tell me how much you trust human rights organizations working on.... (a lot, somewhat, a little, none, don't)
 - A. Women's issues
 - B. Abuses by the military or police
 - C. Gay and lesbian rights
 - D. Access to clean water
- 3.6. In your daily life, how often do you hear the term "human rights"? [READ OPTIONS]
 - 1. Daily
 - <u>2.</u> Frequently
 - 3. Sometimes
 - 4. Rarely
 - 5. Never
 - 8. Don't know [DON'T READ]
 - 9. Refused [DON'T READ]
- 3.7. Where do you most often hear the term "human rights"? [DON'T READ RESPONSE CATEGORIES. RESPONDENT SHOULD ONLY MENTION ONE ANSWER. IF RESPONDENT DOESN'T SPECIFY WHETHER MEDIA IS FOREIGN OR MEXICAN, INTERVIEWER SHOULD PROBE.]

[RECORD VERBATIM] _____ [USE TABLE BELOW TO CODE]

| | [ONLY
ACCEP
T 1
RESPO
NSE] |
|---|--|
| 1. Mexican newspapers | 1 |
| 2. Mexican radio stations | 2 |
| 3. Mexican TV stations | 3 |
| 4. Internet | 4 |
| 5. Foreign media (newspaper, radio, TV, | 5 |

| | [ONLY
ACCEP
T 1
RESPO
NSE] |
|---|--|
| website) | |
| 6. Social media | 6 |
| (Facebook, Twitter) | |
| 7. Conversations with my friends, family, or people in my community | 7 |
| 8. Political discussions | 8 |
| 9. Government agencies | 9 |
| 10. Human rights organizations, activists, or workers | 10 |
| 11. Religious leaders or institutions | 11 |
| 12. Other | 12 |
| 98. Don't know | 98 |
| 99. Refused to answer | 99 |

- 3.8. Have you ever met someone that works in a human rights organization?
 - 1. Yes (ASK 3.9)
 - <u>2.</u> No (**SKIP TO 3.10**)
 - 8. Don't know (**SKIP TO 3.10**)
 - 9. Refused (**SKIP TO 3.10**)
- 3.9. Do you know which human rights organization it was? [RECORD VERBATIM]
- 3.10. Has a human rights organization directly contact you in person, by phone, or by mail?
 - 1. Yes
 - 2. No
 - 8. Don't know [DON'T READ]
 - 9. Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ]
- 3.11. Now I would like to know what you associate the term "human rights" with. In your opinion, on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means "not at all" and 7 means "a lot", how strongly do you associate ______ with the term "human rights". [SHOW CARD WITH 1-7 SCALE] [ROTATE]
 - A. Promoting socio-economic justice

- B. Protecting people from torture and murder
- C. Promoting free and fair elections
- D. Protecting criminals
- E. Promoting United States interests
- F. Promoting foreign values and ideas
- G. Protecting women's rights
- H. Protecting foreign business interests
- I. Protecting you and your family
- J. Providing clean water for everyone
- K. Protecting gay, lesbian or transgender people
- L. Promoting the agendas of political malcontents
- 3.12. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means "THEY'RE NOT ASSOCIATED AT ALL" and 7 means "THEY'RE ASSOCIATED A LOT," how much do you associate nongovernmental human rights organizations in Mexico City with [READ OPTIONS]? [ROTATE]
 - A. Corrupt (where 1 means "not at all corrupt" and 7 means "very corrupt")
 - B. Brave (where 1 means "not at all brave" and 7 means "very brave")
 - C. Elitist (where 1 means "not at all elitist" and 7 means "very elitist")
 - D. Serving the United States government's interests (where 1 means "not at all an agent of a foreign power," and 7 means "very much an agent of a foreign power.")
 - E. Effective (where 1 means "not at all effective," and 7 means "very effective")
 - F. Connected to the needs of ordinary people (where 1 means, "not at all connected," and 7 means "very connected")
- 3.13. [SELF-MONITORING]: On a scale of 1 through 4, where 1 equals "I never do this," and 4 equals "I always do this," please rate the following statements as they apply to you.
 - A. In order to have a good time and be liked, I tend to do what other people expect of
 - B. I exaggerate my good qualities to other people.
 - C. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be in a good mood to others.
 - D. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
- 3.14. In your opinion, how much are human rights respected in Mexico?
 - A lot
 - Some
 - A little
 - $\frac{1}{2}$. $\frac{3}{4}$. $\frac{4}{8}$. Not at all
 - Don't Know
 - Refused
- 3.15. Now on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "NOT ALL RESPONSIBLE" and 7 is "COMPLETELY RESPONSIBLE," how responsible is/are [READ EACH ANSWER CHOICE for Mexico's human rights problems? Remember you may choose any number between 1 and 7. [ROTATE] [SHOW CARD: 1-7 SCALE]

| | Not
responsibl
e at all | | | | | | Fully
responsibl | Don't
know | Refused |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|---------------|---------|
| A. The Mexican federal government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 9
9 |
| B. The United State government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 9
9 |
| C. Foreign big business | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 9 |
| D. Mexican criminal and drug cartels | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 9 |
| E. Mexican big business | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 9
9 |
| F. The Church | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 9 |

- 3.16. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "NOT AT ALL WILLING" and 7 is "COMPLETELY WILLING", how willing are you to ______ [READ ANSWER CHOICES] to promote human rights in Mexico? [SHOW CARD: 1-7 SCALE]
 - A. Give 50 pesos each month to a Mexican human rights organization
 - B. Spend one evening each month participating in an activity of a Mexican human rights organization
 - C. Pay 500 pesos more in taxes to fund independent human rights activities
 - D. Pay 50 pesos each month to the Church so it can fund human rights activities
 - E. To publicly complain about abusive police behavior
- 3.17. Now I'm going to read three sets of two statements and would like you to tell me which statement you agree with more.

FRASE A "Mexico should use an 'iron fist' approach to fight crime, even if it means some people's rights are violated".

FRASE B "Mexico should always respect people's rights, even if it means fighting crime without an iron fist approach."

Do you agree more with Statement A, Statement B, or equally agree with both?

- 1. Agree more with A
- ⇒13.7.1 And would you say you agree "a lot" or "somewhat" with Statement A?
 - 1. A lot
 - 2. Somewhat
 - 8. Don't know [DON'T READ]
 - 9. Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ]
 - 2. Agree more with B
- → 13.7.2 And would you say you agree "a lot" or "somewhat" with Phrase B?
 - 1. A lot
 - 2. Somewhat
 - 8. Don't know [DON'T READ]

- Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ]
- 3. Equally agree with A and B
- 8. Don't know [**DON'T READ**]
- 9. Refused [DON'T READ]
- 3.18. Have you heard of any organizations or associations working in the field of human rights in Mexico?
 - Yes (GO TO 3.19)
 - <u>2.</u> <u>3.</u> No (SKIP TO QUESTION 3.20)
 - Don't know (SKIP TO QUESTION 3.20)
 - Refused (SKIP TO QUESTION 3.20)
- 3.19. Could you please tell me the name of all the human rights organizations you **SPONTANEOUS** RESPONSES, **WITHOUT** [ACCEPT SUGGESTIONS. RECORD VERBATIM| [AFTER PROBING, INTERVIEWERS CAN WRITE "CAN'T REMEMBER" IF THEY DON'T KNOW

| |
 | 1121.121.12 |
|----|------|-------------|
| A. | | |
| B. | | |
| C. | | |
| D. | | |
| E. | | |

- 98. Don't know [DON'T READ]
- 99. Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ]

3.20. Mexican organizations working to protect human rights in this country often receive money from different sources. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not appropriate at all" and 7 is "very appropriate," how appropriate is it, in your opinion, for Mexican human rights groups to receive money from the following. **IROTATELISHOW CARD: 1-7 SCALE**

| ات | IISHOW CARD. 1-7 SCALE | | | | | | | | | |
|----|------------------------|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|------------|-------------|
| | | Not
appropriate
at all | | | | | | Very
appropriate | Don't know | No repsonse |
| | A. Foreign governments | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| | B. Foreign citizens | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |

| C. International organizations | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
|--------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|
| D. Mexican businesses | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| E. Mexican citizens | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| F. The Mexican government | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| G. Mexican political parties | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| H. The Church | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |

- 3.21. In your opinion, where do non-governmental human rights organizations in Mexico receive MOST of their funding from? [READ EACH OPTION, INCLUDING "OTHER." SELECT ONLY ONE ANSWER.] [ROTATE]
 - Mexican citizens
 - Mexican government
 - 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Foreign citizens
 - Foreign governments
 - International organizations
 - Other (Please specify)
 - Don't know [DON'T READ] 98.
 - 99 Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ]

4. EXISTING PARTICIPATION/ DONATION ACTIVITIES

We know that many people would like to participate in or donate to charitable organizations, but may not be able to for all kinds of legitimate reasons. Remember, this is not a test and we want YOUR OPINION, so there are no right or wrong answers.

[ENUMERATOR: ASK BY ROW. FOR EXAMPLE, "A. POLITICAL PARTIES: PARTICIPATED, DONATED, VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, 12 MONTHS" THEN MOVE TO "B. OTHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: PARTICIPATED, DONATED, VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, 12 MONTHS"

| | pa | Have
rticip | 4.1
you e
ated i
ng act | n the | ANSV | 4.2 Have you ever donated to? [IF THEY ANSWER "NO" TO ALL THE OPTIONS, SKIP TO 4.5] | | | GO TO 4.21 IF
YES TO 4.2 | 4.2.1 Was the donation compulsory or voluntary? | | | or | 4.2.2 Did you donate to this organization in the past 12 months? | | | |
|---|-----|----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|---|------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|---|-----------|------------|-------------------|--|-------------------------------|------------|-------------------|
| | Yes | No | Don't know | Refused to answer | Yes | No | Don't know | Refused to answer | | Compulsory | Voluntary | Don't know | Refused to answer | Yes (ASK 4.4 AFTER
SERIES) | No (ASK 4.5 AFTER
SERIES)) | Don't know | Refused to answer |
| | _ | | • | | | | ' | | | | | | | | | | → |
| A. Political parties | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | \Rightarrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| B. Other political organizations | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | \Rightarrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| C. Unionons | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | \Rightarrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| D. Human Rights organizations | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1
(AS
K
4.3) | 2
(AS
K
4.3) | 98 | 99 | \uparrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| E. Religious organizations, apart from going to service or mass | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | \Rightarrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| F. Envrionemntal organizations | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | \Rightarrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| G. Neighborhood associations | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | \Rightarrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| H. Parent associations | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | \Rightarrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| I. Social movements | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | \Rightarrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| J. Other (Specify) | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | \Rightarrow | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |

IF "YES" TO 4.2D AND "YES" TO ANY BETWEEN 4.22.A-J \rightarrow GO TO 4.4 IF "YES" TO 4.2D AND "NO" TO <u>ALL</u> 4.2.2A-J \rightarrow GO TO 4.5 IF "NO" TO 4.2D AND "YES" TO ANY BETWEEN 3.22.A-J \rightarrow GO TO 4.3 IF "NO" TO 4.2D AND "NO" TO <u>ALL</u> 4.2.2A-J \rightarrow GO TO 4.3, THEN PASS TO 4.5

4.1. See above table

- 4.2. See above table
- 4.3. [IF "YES" TO 4.2D→ GO T0 4.4]

[IF "NO" TO 4.2.D "HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS", ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTION]

People have many good reasons for <u>not</u> donating to human rights organizations. Please, using the following reasons, tell me how much you are or disagree with each reason in respect to yourself. [READ ALL OPTIONS AND MARK IF RESPONDENT SAID "AGREE" OR "DISAGREE"]

| EIT SIND HOILE ON DIS | 101 |
 | | |
|---|-------|----------|------------|---------|
| | Agree | Disagree | Don't know | Refused |
| 1.You never donate to any organization | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 2. You don't know what a "human rights organization" is | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 3. You don't trust human rights organizations | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 4. Human rights organizations are not transparent in how they use their resources | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 5. Human rights organizations do not use their money wisely | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 6. You have never been asked to donate to a human rights organization | 1 | 2 | 98 | |
| 7. You don't think human rights organizations help people like me | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 8. You don't donate because you can't afford it | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 9. Other (Please specify) | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |

[IF "NO" TO ALL CHOICES IN 4.2.1 A-J, THAT THEY HAVE NOT DONATED IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS, SKIP TO 4.5]

[IF "YES" TO ANY CHOICES IN 4.2.1 A-J, THAT THEY HAVE DONATED IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS, ASK 4.4]

- 4.4. If you have donated in the past 12 months, how much do you estimate you donated (in Mexican pesos) in the past year?
 - 1. Less than \$200 pesos
 - 2. Between \$200 and \$500 pesos
 - 3. Between \$500 and \$1000 pesos
 - 4. Between \$1000 and \$2000 pesos
 - 5. \$2000 pesos or more
 - 6. Don't know [DON'T READ]
 - 7. Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ]
- 4.5. What is the most convenient method for you to donate money? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS. ACCEPT ONE ANSWER, RECORD VERBATIM, AND CODE BELOW]

| i | m | |)RD | TIT | DD | | TATI | |
|---|----|-----|----------|--------------|----|----|------|--|
| | ıк | "Н. |
)KII |) V H | жк | Δ. | | |

1. Over the phone

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Over the internet with a credit/debit card To someone who comes to my home Via regular mail At an event or demonstration In a collection plate at church In a raffle At an ATM At the supermarket checkout Via payroll deduction In collection boxes on the street Other (Please specify) <u>12.</u> I prefer to give money directly to those who need it, not through an organization 13. Don't know [DON'T READ] 98. Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ] 99.

5. SOCIAL DESIREABILITY MITIGATION

5.1. Please tell me which of the following statements apply to you. (Y/N)

| 8 | | | | |
|---|-----|----|---------------|---------|
| | Yes | No | Don't
know | Refused |
| 1.I always smile when I meet people for the first time. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| 2. I always practice what I preach. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| 3. If I tell someone I will do something, I always keep my promise, no matter how inconvenient it might be. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |
| 4. I always tell the truth. | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 |

6. WILLINGNESS TO DONATE

People donate for all kinds of reasons. We want to know which reasons motivate someone like you to donate.

| pleas | scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "not at all important" and 7 is "very important", the tell me, when you are deciding whether you like an organization, how are trant is ? Remember you can choose any number between 1 and |
|---------------------|--|
| _ | OTATE] [DON'T KNOW=8, REFUSED=9][SHOW CARD: 1-7 SCALE] |
| <u>1.</u> | The organization is trustworthy |
| <u>2.</u> | The organization is well known |
| <u>3.</u> | The organization is transparent in its use of resources |
| <u>4.</u> <u>5.</u> | The organization helps directly improve the life of people like me |
| <u>5.</u> | The organization works on changing Mexican laws |
| <u>6.</u> | The organization is endorsed by respected religious leaders |
| <u>7.</u> | The organization is openly critical of the government |
| 8. | You have met someone working in the organization |

6.2. Please tell me how likely you would be to donate money to a human rights organization _____ (Very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, very unlikely).... Somewhat likely Very likely Somewhat Refused Don't know 1. If your contribution were matched by another person 1 2 3 4 98 9 or organization.

7. RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

tax deductible.

These final questions will help us better understand your responses. We will use this data only for statistical purposes.

2

3

4

98

- 7.1. What is your gender? [WRITE DOWN WITHOUT ASKING QUESTION]
 - Male 1.
 - Female
 - Other
- 7.2. Could you please tell me your exact age, in years? (Don't know/Refused)
- 7.3. When you were growing up, how often did you hear adults in your house discuss donating money, clothes, or food to people who weren't your family?
 - Always
 - Sometimes
 - Rarely
 - Never
 - Don't know [DON'T READ]
 - 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ]

2. If your contribution were

7.4. On a scale of 1-7, where 1 is "NO SOLIDARITY" 7 is "TOTAL SOLIDARITY" how much solidarity do you feel with [READ OPTIONS]? [ROTATE] [SHOW CARD: 1-7 SCALE]

| | No
solidarity | | | | | | Total
solidarity | Don't know | Refused |
|--|------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|------------|---------|
| A. All Mexicans | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| B. All people, regardless of where they live | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| C. Indigenous people | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| D. Women | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| E. People living in poverty | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| F. Victims of crime | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| G. People abused by | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |

| the army or police | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|
| H. Gay, lesbian and transgender people | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| I. Central American migrants | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |
| J. People accused of committing crimes | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 98 | 99 |

| 7 - | TT71 | • | | 1 | | 0 |
|-----|-------------|----|-------|----|------|------|
| / > | W/hat | 10 | WALLE | rΔ | 1010 | n'/ |
| 1 | What | 13 | voui | 10 | 1210 | 11 . |
| | | | , | | -9 | |

- Catholic
- Christian
- Protestant/Evangelical
- None
- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 8. Other (Please specify)
- Don't know [DON'T READ]
- Refused [DON'T READ] 9.

7.6. On average, how often do you attend a religious place of worship?

- More than once a week
- Once a week
- Once or twice a month
- A few times a year
- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Seldom
- Never
- 8. Don't know [DON'T READ]
- Refused [DON'T READ] 9.

7.7. People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?

- Several times a day
- Once a day
- A few times a week
- Once a week
- A few times a month
- Seldom
- Never
- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Don't know [DON'T READ]
- Refused [DON'T READ]

| 7.8. | On a sca | le o | f 0 to 10, v | where 0 is | "NOT A | T AL | L IMPOR | ΓANT" ar | nd 10 is " | VERY |
|------|--------------|------|--------------|------------|--------------|--------|-------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| | IMPOR | ΓΑΝ | T", how i | mportant | is religio | n in y | our life? Y | ou may u | se 0, 10, | or any |
| | number | in | between. | [SHOW | CARD: | 0-10 | SCALE] | [DON'T | KNOW | =998, |
| | REFUSE | ED= | 9991 | | | | | | | |

- 7.9. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "I am not at all indignant" and 7 is "I am very indignant," how indignant are you about human rights conditions in Mexico today? [SHOW CARD: 1-7 SCALE] [DON'T KNOW =998, REFUSED=999]
- 7.10. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is "I do not at all agree," and 7 is "I completely agree," to what extent do you agree with the statement, "Individuals like me can make a difference in the world"? [SHOW CARD: 1-7 SCALE] [DON'T KNOW **=998, REFUSED=999**]
- 7.11. Regardless of how you have voted, do you consider yourself a priista, panista, perredista, morenista, verde, or an adherent of another party?
 - Priista 1.
 - Panista
 - Perredista
 - Morenista
 - Partido Verde
 - Other (specify)
 - None
 - 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Don't know [DON'T READ]
 - Refused [DON'T READ]

7.12. Could you please name ...? [ACCEPT NICKNAMES, ACRONYMS, LAST NAMESI. {IF THE RESPONSENDET DOESN'T KNOW THE ANSWER, MARK "DON'T KNOW"]

| I KNOW J. | | | | |
|---|---------|-----------|----------------|----------------------------|
| | Correct | Incorrect | know
[DON'T | Refused
[DON'T
READ] |
| 1. The mayor of Mexico City [DO NOT READ ANSWER: Miguel Ángel Mancera] | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 2. The currency of the European Union. [DO NOT READ ANSWER: Euro] | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 3. The President of the United States [DO NOT READ ANSWER: Barack Obama] | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| 4. What the acronym "FIFA" stands for [DO NOT READ ANSWER: Federación Internacional de Futból Asociación] | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |

7.13. With regards to your political orientation, on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means political left and 10 political right, where do you place yourself? You can select any number including 0, 10, and any in between.

- 7.14. We know some people cannot vote due to other commitments. Did you vote in the 2015 congressional elections?
 - Yes
 - <u>1.</u> <u>2.</u> No
 - Don't know
 - Refused/Prefer not to answer

7.15. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (USE TABLE TO **CODE RESPONSES)**

| SPUNSES) | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| | First | Second | Third | Fourth | Fifth | Sixth |
| 1. None | (0) | | | | | |
| 2. Primary | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| 3. Secondary | (7) | (8) | (9) | | | |
| 4. Bachillerato / Technical School | (10) | (11) | (12) | | | |
| 5. University | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) |
| 6. Postgraduate | (19) | (20) | (21) | (22+) | | |
| Don't know | (98) | | | | | |
| Refused/Prefe
r not to
answer | (99) | | | | | |

7.16. What is the highest level of education YOUR FATHER completed? [USE TABLE TO CODE RESPONSES] [IF NOT THEY DON'T KNOW THEIR FATHER, CODE AS "DON'T KNOW"

| | First | Second | Third | Fourth | Fifth | Sixth |
|------------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| 1. None | (0) | | | | | |
| 2. Primary | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| 3. Secondary | (7) | (8) | (9) | | | |
| 4. Bachillerato / Technical School | (10) | (11) | (12) | | | |
| 5. University | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) |
| 6. Postgraduate | (19) | (20) | (21) | (22+) | | |

| Don't know | (98) | | | |
|---------------------------|------|--|--|--|
| Refused/Prefe
r not to | (99) | | | |
| answer | | | | |

7.17. What is the highest level of education YOUR MOTHER completed? (USE TABLE TO CODE RESPONSES)

| J CODE RESI | CITO | ES) | | | | |
|------------------------------------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|
| | 1° | 2° | 3° | 4° | 5° | 6° |
| 1. None | (0) | | | | | |
| 2. Primary | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| 3. Secondary | (7) | (8) | (9) | | | |
| 4. Bachillerato / Technical School | (10) | (11) | (12) | | | |
| 5. University | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) |
| 6. Postgraduate | (19) | (20) | (21) | (22+) | | |
| Don't know | (98) | | | | | |
| Refused/Prefer not to answer | (99) | | | | | |

| 7 18 | What is | vour c | urrent | marital | status? |
|-------|-----------|--------|---------|----------|---------|
| 7.10. | vv mat 15 | your c | uiitiit | mai itai | status. |

- Married (ANY TYPE) or living together
- Widowed
- 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 8. Divorced or separated
- Single, never married
- Other (specify)
- Don't know [DON'T READ]
- Refused [DON'T READ]

7.19. How many children do you have? (WRITE NUMBER)

- Don't know [DON'T READ] 8.
- 9. Refused [DON'T READ]

| 7.20. Do you speak a language other than Spanis | sh? |
|---|-----|
|---|-----|

- <u>1.</u> Yes 7.20.1.1. If yes, which?
- No
- <u>2.</u> <u>3.</u> Don't know [DON'T READ]
- Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ]

7.21. **Do you consider yourself:**

Indigenous <u>1.</u>

Mixed European and Indigenous ("Mestizo") 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. White Black or Afromexican Mixed black/Afromexican and white ("Mulata") Asian Other (Spontaneous) None (Spontaneous) Don't know [DON'T READ] Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ] 7.22. Have you ever lived in another country? Yes 1. 7.22.1.1. If yes, which? <u>2.</u> No 8. Don't know [DON'T READ] Refused/Prefer not to answer [DON'T READ] 9. 7.23. What was your main work/activity last week? [WRITE IN RESPONSE VERBATIM THEN **CODE BELOW** AND Work 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Have work, but didn't work last week (vacations, sick leave, or illness) Home [GO TO 7.27] Student [GO TO 7.27] Retired [**GO TO 7.27**] Unemployed (not working, but looking for work) [GO TO 7.27] Permanently disabled [GO TO 7.27] Other Specify [GO TO 7.27] Don't know [DON'T READ] [GO TO 7.27] 98. 99. Refused [DON'T READ] [GO TO 7.27] 7.24. What is your occupation? [WRITE IN RESPONSE VERBATIM AND THEN CODE BELOW <u>1.</u> <u>2.</u> Managers Professionals (for example: engineers, analysts, doctors, architect, professors, lawyers, accountants, artists) Technicians and associate professionals <u>3.</u> Clerical support workers (for example: clerks, cashiers, receptionists, assistants) <u>5.</u> Service and sales workers (for example: waiters, bartenders, salespersons, traders, firefighters, police) Skilled agricultural, forestry, or fishery workers <u>6.</u> 7. Craft and related trades workers (for example bricklayers, plumbers, welders,

blacksmiths, cobblers, upholsterers)

domestic workers)

<u>8.</u> 9. Plant and machine operators and assemblers

Elementary occupations (for example: car washer, drivers, street vendors,

10.

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- 10. Armed forces occupations
- 98 Don't know
- 99. Refused

7.25. What is your position in your place of work?

- Salaried employee, such as clerk, bureaucrat, manager, salesperson, professional (no manual labor)
- Worker/laborer
- Farmer or agricultural worker
- Self-employed (not salaried)
- Educator
- Domestic worker
- 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Other (please specify)
- Don't know [DON'T READ]
- Refused [DON'T READ]

7.26. In your main job, are you responsible for supervising the work of other employees?

- Yes <u>1.</u>
- 2. No
- Don't know [DON'T READ]
- Refused [DON'T READ]

7.27. Now, please think of the person who provides most of this household's income and tell me, what is the occupation of the person who provides most of the household income? [RECORD VERBATIM THEN CODE RESPONSE BELOW]

- Managers 1.
- <u>2.</u> Professionals (for example: engineers, analysts, doctors, architect, professors, lawyers, accountants, artists)
- Technicians and associate professionals
- Clerical support workers (for example: clerks, cashiers, receptionists, assistants)
- 3. 4. 5. Service and sales workers (for example: waiters, bartenders, salespersons, traders, firefighters, police)
- Agricultural, forestry, or fishery workers
- 6. 7. 8. 9. Craft and related trades workers (for example bricklayers, plumbers, welders
- Plant and machine operators and assemblers
- Elementary occupations (for example: car washer, drivers, street vendors, domestic workers)
- Armed forces occupations 10.
- 11. Respondent provides majority of income
- Don't know [DON'T READ] 98.
- Refused [DON'T READ] 99.

7.28. Now, what is (or was) YOUR FATHER's occupation? [RECORD VERBATIM THEN CODE RESPONSE BELOW

- Managers
- <u>1.</u> <u>2.</u> Professionals (for example: engineers, analysts, doctors, architect, professors, lawyers, accountants, artists)
- Technicians and associate professionals <u>3.</u>

- <u>4.</u> <u>5.</u> Clerical support workers (for example: clerks, cashiers, receptionists, assistants)
- Service and sales workers (for example: waiters, bartenders, salespersons, traders, firefighters, police)
- <u>6.</u> <u>7.</u> Agricultural, forestry, or fishery workers
- Craft and related trade workers (for example bricklayers, plumbers, welders, blacksmiths, cobblers, upholsterers)
- <u>8.</u> <u>9.</u> Plant and machine operators and assemblers
- Elementary occupations (for example: car washer, drivers, street vendors, domestic workers)
- 10. Armed forces occupations
- 11. Retired/Pensioned
- 98. Don't know [DON'T READ]
- 99. Refused [DON'T READ]
- Could you please tell me if your house has...? (Yes/No/Don't know/Refused) 7.29.
 - A television
 - 1. 2. 3. 4. A washing machine
 - A microwave
 - Potable water in the home
 - A computer
- 7.30. How many light bulbs are there in your home?
 - 98. Don't know [DON'T READ]
 - 99. Refused [DON'T READ]
- 7.31. And how many cars or vehicles do members of your household have (not counting taxis)?
 - Don't know [DON'T READ]
 - Refused [DON'T READ] 9
- 7.32. [SHOW CARD: INCOME] The next question concerns your household's total monthly income. What is the total monthly income of all the individuals who work in your house?
 - None
 - Less than \$800
 - Between \$801-\$1,600
 - \$1,601-\$2,400
 - \$2,401-\$3,200
 - \$3,201-\$4,000
 - 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. \$4,001-\$5,400
 - \$5,401-\$6,800
 - \$6,801-\$10,000
 - \$10,001-\$13,500
 - 11. More than \$13,500
 - 98. Don't know [DON'T READ]
 - Refused [DON'T READ] 99.

Thinking of your total household income, which statement best describes your income status? (READ OPTIONS AND MARK A RESPONSE.)

- My income can cover expenses and I can save.
- 1. 2. 3. 4. My income can just cover expenses, without major difficulties.
- My income cannot cover expenses, and I have difficulties.
- My income cannot cover expenses, and I have major difficulties.
- 8. Don't know [DON'T READ]
- Refused [DON'T READ] 9.

Do you have landline telephone service in your home?

- Yes <u>1.</u>
- <u>2.</u> No
- 8. Don't know
- 9. Refused

7.35. Do you have a cell phone/mobile?

- Yes
- <u>1.</u> <u>2.</u> No
- 8. Don't know
- 9. Refused

7.36. **Do you use the Internet?**

- Yes
- <u>1.</u> <u>2.</u> No [SKIP TO 7.40]
- Don't know [DON'T READ] [SKIP TO 7.40] 8.
- Refused [DON'T READ] [SKIP TO 7.40] 9.

How often do you use the Internet? [READ OPTIONS]

- Daily, several times a day
- Daily, once
- 1. 2. 3. 4. Three to five times a week
- Occasionally
- 8. Don't know
- Refused

7.38. Do you use Facebook?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 8. Don't know
- 9. Refused

7.39. **Do you use Twitter?**

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 8. Don't know
- 9. Refused

7.40. Do you use another social media site? Please specify. [WRITE FIRST THREE MENTIONED]

<u>1.</u> <u>2.</u> <u>3.</u>

97. No

98. Don't know

99. Refused

7.41. How frequently do you follow the news using... [READ EVERY MEDIUM]?

(Every day, a few times per week, a few times per month, rarely, or never)?

| | Ever day | A few times per week | A few times per month | Rarely | Never | Don't
know | Refused |
|---|---------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--------|----------|---------------|----------|
| A. Television | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| On which Channel do you watch the majority of the news? | | | | | | | |
| B. Internet | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| From which website do you get the major | ity of the ne | ews? | | | _ | | |
| C. Radio | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| From which radio station do you listen to | the majority | y of the new | vs? | | | | |
| D. Print news [websites code as INTERNET] | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| From which newspaper do you read the m | ajority of th | ne news? | | | | | |
| E. Conversations with other people | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 98 | 99 |
| What is your relationship with this person | on/these peo | ople: family | y, friend, | co-wo | rker, ne | ighbor, o | r other? |

7.42. Remember to respond only if you choose to do so. During the last three years, have you, or a member of your family, been the target of...? (Yes, No, Don't know, Refused)

| 9 | | | | |
|--|-----|----|----------------|----------------------------|
| | Yes | No | know
[DON'T | Refused
[DON'T
READ] |
| A. House robbery/break-in | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| B. Street assault | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| C. Arbitrary detention | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| D. Kidnapping | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| E. Murder | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| F. Forced disappearance | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| G. Any other form of physical assault on your person | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |
| H. Any form of verbal harassment because | 1 | 2 | 98 | 99 |

| of your identity, race, or gender | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|

| 8. METADA | $\mathbf{T}\mathbf{A}$ | |
|-----------|------------------------|--|
|-----------|------------------------|--|

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|------|------|-----|----------|------|----|------|-------|------|
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| υ.ι. | 1110 | 100 | σ | uom | 10 | 11 / | 11112 | 111. |

- A single-family home
- Apartment building
- Low-income, multi-family housing
- Rooftop habitation
- Location not constructed for habitation
- 8.2. In general, during the interview, how interested was the respondent?
 - Very
 - Somewhat
 - 1. 2. 3. 4. A little
 - Not at all
 - Don't know
 - Refused
- 8.3. Do you think the respondent trusted or did not trust the real money experiment?
 - <u>1.</u> Trusted
 - 2. Did not trust
 - 8. Don't know
 - They did not complete the real money experiment
- 8.4. Were others present during the interview?
 - <u>1.</u> Yes
 - 2. No
 - Don't know 8.
 - 9. Refused
- 8.5. If "Yes", was this person from the same household, a neighbour, or a bystander who was attentive and monitoring the progress of the interview?
 - Someone from the same household
 - <u>1.</u> <u>2.</u> A neighbour
 - <u>3.</u> A bystander
 - Don't know
 - Refused

| 8.6. Fin | ish time: |
|-----------|------------------------|
| 8.7. Du | ration: |
| 8.8. Inte | erviewer code: |
| 8.9. Naı | ne of interviewer: |
| 8.10. | Age of interviewer: |
| | Gender of interviewer: |

Female 1.

- Male Other

2.1 REAL MONEY EXPERIMENT AMOUNT:

Appendix C. Real Money Experiment

The table below shows the results of a regression predicting the amount of money people donated in the real money experiment. We use fixed effects to correct for clustering at the sampling unit level, and include dummy variables for districts that were statistically different from the average.

We control for a variety of factors, including "self-monitoring," an index of responses to questions asking people about their willingness to go against established social norms. We do this to account for the possibility that the donations people made were a byproduct of respondents trying to appear as socially desirable.


Our independent variables of interest help us identify the demographic and political profile of likely HRO supporters. On the demographic side, we found that people with higher levels of education were more likely to donate, as were people who reported being economically secure (which was usually, but not always, those with larger incomes). Other demographic variables such as gender and age had no effect, and are thus not included in the model below.

Politically, we found no differences between left-leaning and right-leaning individuals (not reported). Respondents involved with political parties donated less, but the politically knowledgably donated more. Variables that touch on familiarity with human rights overall, and human rights organizations in particular, are strong predictors. Those had donated in the past donated about \$7 pesos more than those who had not. Respondents that had a strong idea of what human rights are, measured by associating them with either physical integrity or socioeconomic justice, were also more likely to donate.

Finally, our experimental treatments also showed a strong effect. Organizations that emphasized transparency and efficacy outperformed those that did not. In contrast, the narrative treatment was not an effective strategy.

| | Increase in \$Pesos Donated
("±" = Plausible Range) |
|--|--|
| Frames (reference = Control) | |
| Transparency | 4.07*** (±1.62) |
| Efficacy | 2.68* (±1.63) |
| Narrative | 1.74 (±1.65) |
| Have you ever donated to a local rights organization? | 6.96** (±3.24) |
| How much do you trust local rights organizations? | 1.37** (±0.68) |
| How much respect is there for HR in Mexico? | -0.93 (±0.77) |
| What is your subjective income | 2.21*** (±0.83) |
| Have you ever participated in the activities of a HRO? | -3.83 (±2.90) |
| Have you ever participated in a political party? | -5.71*** (±1.70) |
| Have you ever participated in a union? | 3.42 (±2.17) |
| How much solidarity do you feel (index) | 1.32* (±0.78) |
| I consider "human rights" to be an issue of protecting physical integrity | 1.39* (±0.76) |
| I consider "human rights" to be mostly an issue of socioeconomic justice | 1.19* (±0.67) |
| I believe that crime causes human rights problems | -0.69* (±0.38) |
| I have positive associations with the phrase, "human rights organizations" | 2.58*** (±0.78) |
| Education | 0.40*** (±0.16) |
| Political knowledge index | 1.62** (±0.79) |
| Self-monitoring index | 0.59 (±0.52) |
| Female interviewer | -3.11** (±1.30) |
| How many human rights organizations can you name? | -1.42 (±1.11) |
| <u> "Burrough" (delegación)</u> | |
| Cuauhtemoc | -8.39* (±4.85) |
| Iztacalco | -10.91*** (±4.34) |
| Milpa Alta | 12.30** (±6.14) |
| Tláhuac | 8.90* (±5.02) |
| Xochimilco | 6.87* (±4.15) |
| N | 804 |
| R ² | 0.18 |

Appendix D: Discrete Choice Experiment Descriptions



| Brand | Corresponding Phrase | |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Religious | is a Mexican organization of lay Catholics that | |
| Social
Movement | is a movement of citizens that | |
| Corporate | is an organization of
Mexican business leaders that | |
| Human
Rights | is a Mexican human rights organization that | |

| Issue | Activity | Corresponding Phrase (Issue + Activity) |
|-------------------------|------------|--|
| LGBT | Assistance | provides economic support to gay,
lesbian, and transgender people |
| LGBT | Pressure | pressures the authorities to punish
discrimination against gay, lesbian, and
transgender people. |
| Women | Assistance | provides women economic support for their progress. |
| Women | Pressure | pressures authorities to punish discrimination against women. |
| Water | Assistance | provides potable water to people who do not have clean water. |
| Water | Pressure | pressures authorities to punish water pollution. |
| Forced
Disappearance | Assistance | provides families economic support to families of the disappeared. |
| Forced
Disappearance | Pressure | pressures authorities to punish forced disappearances. |