Human dignity belongs to every person. It is unearned and unforfeitable. Recognizing this dignity in those who have been wronged is uncontroversial. Extending it to those who have done harm is much more challenging. Within the field of Business and Human Rights (BHR), where wrongdoing concentrates in powerful, easily vilified figures, the question becomes: can advocates prioritize accountability and dignity simultaneously?
This question shifts our understanding of dignity from something requiring protection to something that is inhabited. It suggests that any utopia worth achieving must be one in which we safeguard human rights and maintain empathy toward the people we would most like to punish or cast out.
Outwardly complete, inwardly empty
Imagine we achieve the goal of the human rights project: a world where every right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is honored, no one is tortured, no one is trafficked, no one needlessly starves, and no child is kept from a classroom. Such a world would rest on the premise that every person possesses inherent dignity.
The Universal Declaration grounds human rights in “the inherent dignity . . . of all members of the human family,” and rigorous philosophical arguments concur that dignity is a status, not a reward for good conduct. James Griffin, for example, argues that human rights protect our normative agency—our capacity to choose and pursue a worthwhile life—and that dignity does not come in degrees. This conviction is the foundation of the human rights project.
However, people can abide by laws without being convinced of their legitimacy. States and NGOs can construct institutions that deter rights violations while still believing that some people are worth less than others and that dignity is alienable. The machinery runs, but the conviction is absent.
This matters because human rights are not privileges to be policed but values we inhabit. To “follow” human rights in the fullest sense is not just to comply with a set of rules but also to be convinced and moved by human dignity. A regime of perfectly protected rights devoid of conviction would be outwardly complete but inwardly empty—and unstable, for a commitment without conviction will break the moment enforcement relaxes.
The victim but also the violator
This truth should trouble human rights scholars, but the BHR literature has not addressed it substantively. Human rights scholars have exhaustively explored the justification of rights, their content, and their enforcement but have devoted comparatively little energy to the conditions and mindsets that give rights meaning. Other fields have begun to address the question. Penal theory, for example, has taken up perhaps its hardest test: protecting the rights of the violator rather than the victim. The German Federal Constitutional Court's ruling on life imprisonment and the European Court of Human Rights' judgment in Vinter and Others v. United Kingdom, for example, both ground limits on punishment in the offender's inviolable dignity.
Human dignity, if it is genuinely inherent and unearnable, is also unbendable: a person who has violated the rights of others does not become less of a human being. Immanuel Kant put this most precisely: “The human being is indeed unholy enough, but the humanity in his person must be holy to him.” By contrast, most people’s instinct, when faced with serious wrongdoers, is to expel, to vilify, to sort the world into an “us” who deserve dignity and a “them” who have forfeited it. But the moment we treat dignity as something a person can lose through their conduct, we have accepted the abuser's own logic—that dignity is conditional—and abandoned the universalism that gives human rights their justification.
The CEO in BHR
In 2018, Dutch NGO Milieudefensie announced a lawsuit against Shell, alleging that the oil and gas company was contributing to climate change and that it had a responsibility to mitigate the resulting harms by reducing emissions. In 2021, the Hague District Court decided in favor of Milieudefensie and, in the first ruling of its kind, ordered Shell to cut its carbon emissions by 45% by 2030.
But Milieudefensie also personalized a corporate moral failure by publishing an open letter to Shell CEO Ben van Beurden. On his departure, the Dutch NGO then ran a retrospective titled “Three things Ben van Beurden could have done better as CEO of Shell.” Such tactics have precedent. A decade earlier, Nestlé chairman Peter Brabeck-Letmathe became the very human face of corporate villainy after a clip of him calling the view that water is a human right as “extreme” circulated widely. Looking back yet further into the past, Ray Rogers's “Killer Coke” established an entire model of BHR advocacy: analyze a company’s top executives and directors and pressure them as individuals.
Naming a person makes an abstract harm legible, and legibility is what moves publics, stakeholders, and courts. I do not propose to soften or compromise such work. However, accountability and contempt are not the same thing, and the field slides too easily from the first into the second. When “this CEO must answer for the harm that took place on their watch” becomes “this CEO is less than human,” we have transgressed our own commitments. The powerful violator still bears inherent dignity and is still part of the “all” in “all members of the human family.”
The utopia worth building
The commitment to inhabiting dignity is tested most severely when advocates must decide how to treat those who violate rights. Grappling with this dilemma in BHR demands more than compliance.
When remedying corporate harm, we must do so without constructing a discourse of “us versus them” that contradicts the very foundation of the human rights project. A utopia worth building is one grounded in compassion for those who have done us harm and respect for their human dignity.